@techreport{Agrawaletal2024,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {Wealth Tax Mobility and Tax Coordination},
  author = {Agrawal, David R. and Foremny, Dirk and {Mart{\'i}nez-Toledano}, Clara},
  year = {2024},
  month = apr,
  number = {11048},
  institution = {CESifo},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.4793904},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4793904},
  abstract = {We study the effects of decentralized wealth taxation on mobility and the effectiveness of tax coordination at mitigating tax competition. We exploit the reintroduction of the Spanish wealth tax, after which all regions except Madrid levied positive tax rates. We find the mobility responses to wealth taxes are within the range of prior estimates with respect to income taxes. However, wealth tax mobility responses generate losses to personal income tax revenues that are six times larger than the direct losses to wealth taxes. Madrid could achieve higher total regional revenues by agreeing to a harmonized positive tax rate.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

We study the effects of decentralized wealth taxation on mobility and the effectiveness of tax coordination at mitigating tax competition. We exploit the reintroduction of the Spanish wealth tax, after which all regions except Madrid levied positive tax rates. We find the mobility responses to wealth taxes are within the range of prior estimates with respect to income taxes. However, wealth tax mobility responses generate losses to personal income tax revenues that are six times larger than the direct losses to wealth taxes. Madrid could achieve higher total regional revenues by agreeing to a harmonized positive tax rate.

@article{Kapelleretal2023,
  title = {Can a {{European}} Wealth Tax Close the Green Investment Gap?},
  author = {Kapeller, Jakob and Leitch, Stuart and Wildauer, Rafael},
  year = {2023},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Ecological Economics},
  volume = {209},
  doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2023.107849},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2023.107849},
  abstract = {This paper analyses the European Commission's assessment of investment needs as implied by the EU's Paris commitment. We find that official estimates of the green investment gap until 2050 are likely to seriously understate actual investment required. Against this backdrop, we assess the potential of a European wealth tax to close this investment gap. In doing so, we first provide a detailed estimate of the wealth distribution across 22 EU member countries and then develop a microsimulation model for recurring wealth taxes in these countries. The model is based on household survey data from the HFCS, but compensates for missing observations at the top of the wealth distribution by means of a Pareto model. Taking different tax designs into account, we generally find a substantial revenue potential that could contribute significantly to closing currently existing green investment gaps. We also find that compensating for the `missing rich' is essential for sensibly evaluating progressive tax designs.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {107849}
}

This paper analyses the European Commission's assessment of investment needs as implied by the EU's Paris commitment. We find that official estimates of the green investment gap until 2050 are likely to seriously understate actual investment required. Against this backdrop, we assess the potential of a European wealth tax to close this investment gap. In doing so, we first provide a detailed estimate of the wealth distribution across 22 EU member countries and then develop a microsimulation model for recurring wealth taxes in these countries. The model is based on household survey data from the HFCS, but compensates for missing observations at the top of the wealth distribution by means of a Pareto model. Taking different tax designs into account, we generally find a substantial revenue potential that could contribute significantly to closing currently existing green investment gaps. We also find that compensating for the `missing rich' is essential for sensibly evaluating progressive tax designs.

@article{SchechtlTisch2023,
  title = {Tax Principles, Policy Feedback and Self-Interest: Cross-National Experimental Evidence on Wealth Tax Preferences},
  author = {Schechtl, Manuel and Tisch, Daria},
  year = {2023},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Socio-Economic Review},
  doi = {10.1093/ser/mwac071},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwac071},
  abstract = {Rising wealth inequality and squeezed public budgets has brought wealth tax back into policy discussions. A net wealth tax might help to boost state revenue and reduce wealth inequality. Yet little is known about citizens' attitudes towards the design of a net wealth tax (i.e. the tax unit, exemption and rate). Using a novel multifactorial survey experiment, we examine citizens' endorsement of fundamental principles of taxation. Building on policy feedback theory, we examine if preferences differ in three policy arenas (USA, Germany and UK) and whether individuals' reasoning is dependent on self-interest. While a clear majority in all three countries generally endorses a wealth tax, our findings show that citizens care more about the amount exempted than the tax unit or rate. We do not identify a preference for any specific tax unit. Furthermore, tax preferences seem to be strikingly similar among citizens of all three countries. Yet we show that individuals are mostly concerned about not being personally affected by such a tax, which is reflected in their preference for substantial exemptions. We discuss our findings with regard to our understanding of wealth inequality, tax equity and the potential implications for policymakers.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Wealth Taxation},
  note = {mwac071}
}

Rising wealth inequality and squeezed public budgets has brought wealth tax back into policy discussions. A net wealth tax might help to boost state revenue and reduce wealth inequality. Yet little is known about citizens' attitudes towards the design of a net wealth tax (i.e. the tax unit, exemption and rate). Using a novel multifactorial survey experiment, we examine citizens' endorsement of fundamental principles of taxation. Building on policy feedback theory, we examine if preferences differ in three policy arenas (USA, Germany and UK) and whether individuals' reasoning is dependent on self-interest. While a clear majority in all three countries generally endorses a wealth tax, our findings show that citizens care more about the amount exempted than the tax unit or rate. We do not identify a preference for any specific tax unit. Furthermore, tax preferences seem to be strikingly similar among citizens of all three countries. Yet we show that individuals are mostly concerned about not being personally affected by such a tax, which is reflected in their preference for substantial exemptions. We discuss our findings with regard to our understanding of wealth inequality, tax equity and the potential implications for policymakers.

@techreport{Albaceteetal2022,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {The Wealth Distribution and Redistributive Preferences: Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment},
  author = {Albacete, Nicol{\'a}s and Fessler, Pirmin and Lindner, Peter},
  year = {2022},
  month = may,
  number = {239},
  institution = {Oesterreichische Nationalbank},
  url = {https://www.oenb.at/en/Publications/Economics/Working-Papers.html},
  urldate = {2024-05-30},
  abstract = {We analyze a large-scale randomized experiment on redistributive preferences within the Austrian part of one of the most comprehensive wealth surveys - the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey. Austria displays a nearly perfect laboratory for such an experiment as it has very low levels of wealth taxation and no inheritance tax but at the same time a rather high level of wealth inequality. We estimate the causal effect of information of one's own rank in the wealth distribution on preference for wealth taxation. Previous literature has mostly focused on the income distribution instead of wealth. We find the average treatment effect to be very small and insignificant. For the group however, who overestimates their own position in the wealth distribution information on their true rank has a strong positive effect, while for the group underestimating their position originally the effect turns out to be negative. Both combined show up as the null effect overall. As theory suggests, information thus has a different effect depending on prior beliefs.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

We analyze a large-scale randomized experiment on redistributive preferences within the Austrian part of one of the most comprehensive wealth surveys - the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey. Austria displays a nearly perfect laboratory for such an experiment as it has very low levels of wealth taxation and no inheritance tax but at the same time a rather high level of wealth inequality. We estimate the causal effect of information of one's own rank in the wealth distribution on preference for wealth taxation. Previous literature has mostly focused on the income distribution instead of wealth. We find the average treatment effect to be very small and insignificant. For the group however, who overestimates their own position in the wealth distribution information on their true rank has a strong positive effect, while for the group underestimating their position originally the effect turns out to be negative. Both combined show up as the null effect overall. As theory suggests, information thus has a different effect depending on prior beliefs.

@article{Brulhartetal2022,
  title = {Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from {{Switzerland}}},
  author = {Br{\"u}lhart, Marius and Gruber, Jonathan and Krapf, Matthias and Schmidheiny, Kurt},
  year = {2022},
  month = nov,
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
  volume = {14},
  number = {4},
  pages = {111--150},
  doi = {10.1257/pol.20200258},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200258},
  abstract = {We study how declared wealth responds to changes in wealth tax rates. Exploiting rich intranational variation in Switzerland, we find a 1 percentage point drop in a canton's wealth tax rate raises reported taxable wealth by at least 43 percent after 6 years. Administrative tax records of two cantons with quasi-randomly assigned differential tax reforms suggest that 24 percent of the effect arises from taxpayer mobility and 21 percent from a concurrent rise in housing prices. Savings responses appear unable to explain more than a small fraction of the remainder, suggesting sizable evasion responses in this setting with no third-party reporting of financial wealth.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

We study how declared wealth responds to changes in wealth tax rates. Exploiting rich intranational variation in Switzerland, we find a 1 percentage point drop in a canton's wealth tax rate raises reported taxable wealth by at least 43 percent after 6 years. Administrative tax records of two cantons with quasi-randomly assigned differential tax reforms suggest that 24 percent of the effect arises from taxpayer mobility and 21 percent from a concurrent rise in housing prices. Savings responses appear unable to explain more than a small fraction of the remainder, suggesting sizable evasion responses in this setting with no third-party reporting of financial wealth.

@article{KindermannKrueger2022,
  title = {High Marginal Tax Rates on the Top 1 Percent? Lessons from a Life-Cycle Model with Idiosyncratic Income Risk},
  author = {Kindermann, Fabian and Krueger, Dirk},
  year = {2022},
  month = apr,
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics},
  volume = {14},
  number = {2},
  pages = {319--366},
  doi = {10.1257/mac.20150170},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20150170},
  abstract = {This paper argues that high marginal labor income tax rates on top earners are an effective tool for social insurance even when households have high labor supply elasticity, households make dynamic savings decisions, and policies have general equilibrium effects. We construct a large-scale overlapping generations model with uninsurable labor productivity risk, show that it has a realistic wealth distribution, and numerically characterize the optimal top marginal rate. We find that marginal tax rates for top 1 percent earners of 79 percent are optimal as long as the model earnings and wealth distributions display a degree of concentration as observed in US data.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper argues that high marginal labor income tax rates on top earners are an effective tool for social insurance even when households have high labor supply elasticity, households make dynamic savings decisions, and policies have general equilibrium effects. We construct a large-scale overlapping generations model with uninsurable labor productivity risk, show that it has a realistic wealth distribution, and numerically characterize the optimal top marginal rate. We find that marginal tax rates for top 1 percent earners of 79 percent are optimal as long as the model earnings and wealth distributions display a degree of concentration as observed in US data.

@article{Martinez2022,
  title = {Mobility Responses to the Establishment of a Residential Tax Haven: Evidence from {{Switzerland}}},
  author = {Mart{\'i}nez, Isabel Z.},
  year = {2022},
  month = may,
  journal = {Journal of Urban Economics},
  volume = {129},
  pages = {103441},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jue.2022.103441},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2022.103441},
  abstract = {I analyze mobility responses to a tax reform that established the Swiss canton of Obwalden as a tax haven in 2006. The reform, which included a regressive income tax schedule, was explicitly aimed at attracting the top 1\%. Difference-in-Differences (DiD) estimations comparing Obwalden to all other cantons confirm that the reform successfully attracted high-income taxpayers: by 2016, the share of top earners in the canton had doubled, and average income per taxpayer was 16\% higher relative to 2005. Based on individual tax return data, I estimate the mobility elasticity with a two-stage least square (2SLS) approach, which isolates the identifying variation in the tax rate stemming from the 2006 reform only. I find a large elasticity of the stock of high-income taxpayers of 1.5--2 with respect to the net-of-average-tax rate. The corresponding flow elasticity is 7.2. Despite these large behavioral responses, the reform did not increase revenue per capita in the canton. Finally, I find small positive effects on local employment. However, in-movers with high incomes were not more likely to also work in the canton, and I cannot rule out that employment effects were driven by the simultaneous reduction in corporate income taxes.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {103441}
}

I analyze mobility responses to a tax reform that established the Swiss canton of Obwalden as a tax haven in 2006. The reform, which included a regressive income tax schedule, was explicitly aimed at attracting the top 1%. Difference-in-Differences (DiD) estimations comparing Obwalden to all other cantons confirm that the reform successfully attracted high-income taxpayers: by 2016, the share of top earners in the canton had doubled, and average income per taxpayer was 16% higher relative to 2005. Based on individual tax return data, I estimate the mobility elasticity with a two-stage least square (2SLS) approach, which isolates the identifying variation in the tax rate stemming from the 2006 reform only. I find a large elasticity of the stock of high-income taxpayers of 1.5–2 with respect to the net-of-average-tax rate. The corresponding flow elasticity is 7.2. Despite these large behavioral responses, the reform did not increase revenue per capita in the canton. Finally, I find small positive effects on local employment. However, in-movers with high incomes were not more likely to also work in the canton, and I cannot rule out that employment effects were driven by the simultaneous reduction in corporate income taxes.

@techreport{Chatterjeeetal2021,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {A Wealth Tax for {{South Africa}}},
  author = {Chatterjee, Aroop and Czajka, L{\'e}o and Gethin, Amory},
  year = {2021},
  month = jan,
  number = {2021/02},
  institution = {World Inequality Lab},
  url = {https://wid.world/news-article/a-wealth-tax-for-southafrica/},
  urldate = {2024-05-30},
  abstract = {This paper considers the feasibility of implementing a progressive wealth tax to collect additional government revenue to both reinforce fiscal sustainability in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis and reduce persistent extreme inequality in South Africa. Drawing on our new companion paper, we first identify the tax base and discuss the design of potential tax schedules. Testing alternative tax schedules, we estimate how much additional revenue could be collected from a progressive tax on the top 1\% richest South Africans. Our results show that under conservative assumptions, a wealth tax could raise between 70 and 160 billion Rands --- 1.5\% to 3.5\% of the South African GDP. We discuss in turn how sensitive our estimates are to assumptions on (1) mismeasurement of wealth and (2) tax avoidance and evasion, based on the most recent tax policy literature. We examine technical issues related to the enforcement of the tax, and how third-party reporting and pre-filled declarations could be used to optimize measurement of taxable wealth and minimize evasion and avoidance opportunities. Finally, we explain how this new tax could interact with other capital related taxes already in place in South Africa, and discuss the potential impact on growth.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper considers the feasibility of implementing a progressive wealth tax to collect additional government revenue to both reinforce fiscal sustainability in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis and reduce persistent extreme inequality in South Africa. Drawing on our new companion paper, we first identify the tax base and discuss the design of potential tax schedules. Testing alternative tax schedules, we estimate how much additional revenue could be collected from a progressive tax on the top 1% richest South Africans. Our results show that under conservative assumptions, a wealth tax could raise between 70 and 160 billion Rands — 1.5% to 3.5% of the South African GDP. We discuss in turn how sensitive our estimates are to assumptions on (1) mismeasurement of wealth and (2) tax avoidance and evasion, based on the most recent tax policy literature. We examine technical issues related to the enforcement of the tax, and how third-party reporting and pre-filled declarations could be used to optimize measurement of taxable wealth and minimize evasion and avoidance opportunities. Finally, we explain how this new tax could interact with other capital related taxes already in place in South Africa, and discuss the potential impact on growth.

@article{Cheetal2021,
  title = {Taxation of Land and Economic Growth},
  author = {Che, Shulu and Kumar, Ronald Ravinesh and Stauvermann, Peter J.},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Economies},
  volume = {9},
  number = {2},
  pages = {61--80},
  doi = {10.3390/economies9020061},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.3390/economies9020061},
  abstract = {In this paper, we theoretically analyze the effects of three types of land taxes on economic growth using an overlapping generation model in which land can be used for production or consumption (housing) purposes. Based on the analyses in which land is used as a factor of production, we can confirm that the taxation of land will lead to an increase in the growth rate of the economy. Particularly, we show that the introduction of a tax on land rents, a tax on the value of land or a stamp duty will cause the net price of land to decline. Further, we show that the nationalization of land and the redistribution of the land rents to the young generation will maximize the growth rate of the economy.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

In this paper, we theoretically analyze the effects of three types of land taxes on economic growth using an overlapping generation model in which land can be used for production or consumption (housing) purposes. Based on the analyses in which land is used as a factor of production, we can confirm that the taxation of land will lead to an increase in the growth rate of the economy. Particularly, we show that the introduction of a tax on land rents, a tax on the value of land or a stamp duty will cause the net price of land to decline. Further, we show that the nationalization of land and the redistribution of the land rents to the young generation will maximize the growth rate of the economy.

@article{Cummins2021,
  title = {Where Is the Middle Class? Evidence from 60 Million {{English}} Death and Probate Records, 1892--1992},
  author = {Cummins, Neil},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {The Journal of Economic History},
  volume = {81},
  number = {2},
  pages = {359--404},
  doi = {10.1017/S0022050721000164},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050721000164},
  abstract = {This article analyzes a newly constructed individual level dataset of every English death and probate from 1892--1992. This analysis shows that the twentieth century's ``Great Equalization'' of wealth stalled in mid-century. The probate rate, which captures the proportion of English holding any significant wealth at death rose from 10 percent in the 1890s to 40 percent by 1950 and has stagnated to 1992. Despite the large declines in the wealth share of the top 1 percent, from 73 to 20 percent, the median English individual died with almost nothing throughout. All changes in inequality after 1950 involve a reshuffling of wealth within the top 30 percent. I translate the individual level data to synthetic households; the majority have at least one member probated. Yet the bottom 60 percent of households hold only 12 percent of all wealth, at their peak wealth-holding level, in the early 1990s. I also compare the new wealth data with existing estimates of top wealth shares, home-ownership trends, wealth survey distributions, aggregate wealth, and the wealth Gini coefficient.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth,Wealth Taxation}
}

This article analyzes a newly constructed individual level dataset of every English death and probate from 1892–1992. This analysis shows that the twentieth century's ``Great Equalization'' of wealth stalled in mid-century. The probate rate, which captures the proportion of English holding any significant wealth at death rose from 10 percent in the 1890s to 40 percent by 1950 and has stagnated to 1992. Despite the large declines in the wealth share of the top 1 percent, from 73 to 20 percent, the median English individual died with almost nothing throughout. All changes in inequality after 1950 involve a reshuffling of wealth within the top 30 percent. I translate the individual level data to synthetic households; the majority have at least one member probated. Yet the bottom 60 percent of households hold only 12 percent of all wealth, at their peak wealth-holding level, in the early 1990s. I also compare the new wealth data with existing estimates of top wealth shares, home-ownership trends, wealth survey distributions, aggregate wealth, and the wealth Gini coefficient.

@article{Duran-CabreEstellerMore2021,
  title = {A Quantitative Assessment of the Net Wealth Tax: The Spanish Experience},
  author = {{Dur{\'a}n-Cabr{\'e}}, Jos{\'e} M. and Esteller Mor{\'e}, Alejandro},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {CESifo Economic Studies},
  doi = {10.1093/cesifo/ifab004},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifab004},
  abstract = {There is growing debate, both social and academic, about the possibility of levying an annual net wealth tax. Until a few years ago, such a proposal appeared difficult to both implement and control, but recent technological innovations, which could greatly facilitate the periodic valuation of wealth, combined with improvements in international tax information sharing could make a ``modern wealth tax'' possible. Nonetheless, a number of challenges regarding its design still need to be addressed. Taking advantage of the Spanish experience---the only EU country to levy a wealth tax---we undertake a quantitative analysis of various key legal elements of the current tax (exemptions and the common income and wealth tax ceiling) by means of a tax simulator we have developed; we also analyze its redistributive power. Our results show that the family business exemption and the common ceilings are highly regressive. We also assess the effectiveness of alternative reforms with more comprehensive tax bases.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

There is growing debate, both social and academic, about the possibility of levying an annual net wealth tax. Until a few years ago, such a proposal appeared difficult to both implement and control, but recent technological innovations, which could greatly facilitate the periodic valuation of wealth, combined with improvements in international tax information sharing could make a ``modern wealth tax'' possible. Nonetheless, a number of challenges regarding its design still need to be addressed. Taking advantage of the Spanish experience—the only EU country to levy a wealth tax—we undertake a quantitative analysis of various key legal elements of the current tax (exemptions and the common income and wealth tax ceiling) by means of a tax simulator we have developed; we also analyze its redistributive power. Our results show that the family business exemption and the common ceilings are highly regressive. We also assess the effectiveness of alternative reforms with more comprehensive tax bases.

@article{HalvorsenThoresen2021,
  title = {Distributional Effects of a Wealth Tax under Lifetime-dynastic Income Concepts},
  author = {Halvorsen, Elin and Thoresen, Thor O.},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
  volume = {123},
  number = {1},
  pages = {184--215},
  doi = {10.1111/sjoe.12392},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12392},
  abstract = {Annual wealth tax is back on the policy agenda, but discussion of its effect is not well informed.When standard methodology is used and wealth-tax burdens are measured against annualindividual income, it is found that a large share of the tax burden falls on people with low incomes.In this study, we use rich Norwegian administrative data to discuss the distributional effects ofwealth tax under several different income concepts, ultimately measuring income over the lifetimeof family dynasties. When measured against lifetime income and lifetime income in dynasties,wealth tax is mostly borne by high-income taxpayers and is seen as clearly redistributive.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

Annual wealth tax is back on the policy agenda, but discussion of its effect is not well informed.When standard methodology is used and wealth-tax burdens are measured against annualindividual income, it is found that a large share of the tax burden falls on people with low incomes.In this study, we use rich Norwegian administrative data to discuss the distributional effects ofwealth tax under several different income concepts, ultimately measuring income over the lifetimeof family dynasties. When measured against lifetime income and lifetime income in dynasties,wealth tax is mostly borne by high-income taxpayers and is seen as clearly redistributive.

@article{JohannesenStolper2021,
  title = {The Deterrence Effect of Whistleblowing},
  author = {Johannesen, Niels and Stolper, Tim B. M.},
  year = {2021},
  month = nov,
  journal = {The Journal of Law and Economics},
  volume = {64},
  number = {4},
  pages = {821--855},
  doi = {10.1086/715197},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1086/715197},
  abstract = {We document that the first leak of customer information from a tax-haven bank caused a sudden flight of deposits from tax havens and a sharp decrease in the market value of banks known to be assisting with tax evasion. The loss of market value was largest for the banks most strongly involved in tax evasion. Subsequent leaks had qualitatively similar although smaller effects. Our findings suggest that whistleblowing in tax-haven banks deters offshore tax evaders by increasing the perceived risk of committing and assisting with tax evasion.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

We document that the first leak of customer information from a tax-haven bank caused a sudden flight of deposits from tax havens and a sharp decrease in the market value of banks known to be assisting with tax evasion. The loss of market value was largest for the banks most strongly involved in tax evasion. Subsequent leaks had qualitatively similar although smaller effects. Our findings suggest that whistleblowing in tax-haven banks deters offshore tax evaders by increasing the perceived risk of committing and assisting with tax evasion.

@article{Londono-VelezAvila-Mahecha2021,
  title = {Enforcing Wealth Taxes in the Developing World: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from {{Colombia}}},
  author = {{Londo{\~n}o-V{\'e}lez}, Juliana and {\'A}vila-Mahecha, Javier},
  year = {2021},
  month = jun,
  journal = {American Economic Review: Insights},
  volume = {3},
  number = {2},
  pages = {131--148},
  doi = {10.1257/aeri.20200319},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20200319},
  abstract = {This paper investigates the feasibility of wealth taxation in developing countries. It uses rich administrative data from Colombia and leverages a government-designed program for voluntary disclosures of hidden wealth as well as the threat of detection triggered by the Panama Papers leak. There are two key findings. First, there is substantial (primarily offshore) evasion: two-fifths of the wealthiest 0.01 percent evade taxes, with these evaders concealing one-third of their wealth offshore. Second, strengthening enforcement can have a significant impact on wealth tax compliance, tax revenue, and progressivity. These results highlight both challenges and opportunities for wealth taxation in the developing world.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper investigates the feasibility of wealth taxation in developing countries. It uses rich administrative data from Colombia and leverages a government-designed program for voluntary disclosures of hidden wealth as well as the threat of detection triggered by the Panama Papers leak. There are two key findings. First, there is substantial (primarily offshore) evasion: two-fifths of the wealthiest 0.01 percent evade taxes, with these evaders concealing one-third of their wealth offshore. Second, strengthening enforcement can have a significant impact on wealth tax compliance, tax revenue, and progressivity. These results highlight both challenges and opportunities for wealth taxation in the developing world.

@article{SaezZucman2021,
  title = {A Wealth Tax on Corporations' Stock},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Economic Policy},
  pages = {1--16},
  url = {https://gabriel-zucman.eu/},
  abstract = {We propose to institute a new tax on corporations' stock shares for all publicly listed companies headquartered in G20 countries. Every year, each company would have to pay 0.2 percent of the value of its stock in taxes. As the G20 stock market capitalization is around \$90 trillion, the tax would raise approximately \$180 billion each year. Because stock ownership is highly concentrated among the rich, this global tax would be progressive. The tax could be paid in-kind by corporations (by issuing new stock) so that the tax does not raise liquidity issue or affect business operations. In today's globalized and fast-moving world, companies can become enormously valuable once they establish market power, even before they start making large profits (e.g., Amazon and Tesla). This tax would make them start paying taxes sooner. The tax could be enforced by the securities commissions in each country which regulate publicly traded securities and already charge fees on stock issuance and transactions.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

We propose to institute a new tax on corporations' stock shares for all publicly listed companies headquartered in G20 countries. Every year, each company would have to pay 0.2 percent of the value of its stock in taxes. As the G20 stock market capitalization is around $90 trillion, the tax would raise approximately$180 billion each year. Because stock ownership is highly concentrated among the rich, this global tax would be progressive. The tax could be paid in-kind by corporations (by issuing new stock) so that the tax does not raise liquidity issue or affect business operations. In today's globalized and fast-moving world, companies can become enormously valuable once they establish market power, even before they start making large profits (e.g., Amazon and Tesla). This tax would make them start paying taxes sooner. The tax could be enforced by the securities commissions in each country which regulate publicly traded securities and already charge fees on stock issuance and transactions.

@unpublished{SaezZucman2021a,
  title = {How to Get \$1 Trillion from 1000 Billionaires: Tax Their Gains Now},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2021},
  month = apr,
  url = {https://gabriel-zucman.eu/},
  urldate = {2024-05-29},
  abstract = {Billionaires pay low effective tax rates because they can defer taxes on their capital gains for decades or forever as income tax on gains is due only upon sale of assets. US billionaires now own \$4.25 Trillion, out of which \$2.7 Trillion are gains that they haven't paid tax upon yet. During COVID, billionaires untaxed gains increased by \$1.25 Trillion. We propose to end this tax deferral advantage by imposing a one-time tax on the stock of billionaires' unrealized gains at the ordinary tax rate (39.6\%+3.8\% under Biden's plan). Practically, all gains accumulated as of April 1, 2021 will be deemed realized and the tax would be payable over 10 years. This would raise approximately \$1 trillion. Because it is a one-time tax of gains already accumulated, it does not create adverse economic incentives. Because gains will be deemed realized, it is an extra burden only on billionaires who were going to avoid taxes on their gains. Because it is imposed only on billionaires, a highly visible group of less than 1000, it is administratively doable. Billionaires can easily borrow against their wealth or sell part of their business stakes to pay the tax, without affecting the operation of the businesses they own. This is the most progressive tax imaginable and can bring substantial revenue for pressing needs. It fits with and strengthens the Biden administration goal of taxing capital gains like ordinary income.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Billionaires pay low effective tax rates because they can defer taxes on their capital gains for decades or forever as income tax on gains is due only upon sale of assets. US billionaires now own $4.25 Trillion, out of which$2.7 Trillion are gains that they haven't paid tax upon yet. During COVID, billionaires untaxed gains increased by $1.25 Trillion. We propose to end this tax deferral advantage by imposing a one-time tax on the stock of billionaires' unrealized gains at the ordinary tax rate (39.6%+3.8% under Biden's plan). Practically, all gains accumulated as of April 1, 2021 will be deemed realized and the tax would be payable over 10 years. This would raise approximately$1 trillion. Because it is a one-time tax of gains already accumulated, it does not create adverse economic incentives. Because gains will be deemed realized, it is an extra burden only on billionaires who were going to avoid taxes on their gains. Because it is imposed only on billionaires, a highly visible group of less than 1000, it is administratively doable. Billionaires can easily borrow against their wealth or sell part of their business stakes to pay the tax, without affecting the operation of the businesses they own. This is the most progressive tax imaginable and can bring substantial revenue for pressing needs. It fits with and strengthens the Biden administration goal of taxing capital gains like ordinary income.

@article{ScheuerSlemrod2021,
  title = {Taxing Our Wealth},
  author = {Scheuer, Florian and Slemrod, Joel},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  url = {https://www.econ.uzh.ch/en/people/faculty/scheuer/research.html},
  abstract = {This paper evaluates recent prominent proposals for an annual wealth tax. We point out why the former conventional wisdom---that an optimal tax system would feature no taxes on capital---has been overturned, and present a series of arguments that justify pro- gressive taxes on wealth accumulation both in the short and long run. We also discuss under which conditions they should take the form of a wealth tax versus alternative poli- cies that achieve similar objectives. While a dozen OECD countries levied wealth taxes in the recent past, now only three retain them, with only Switzerland raising a comparable fraction of revenue as the U.S. proposals. Studies of these taxes often find a substantial behavioral response, which may indicate a large excess burden. To predict the conse- quences of the U.S.-style proposals, however, one needs to take into account that their design features---especially the rate schedule, broadness of the base, and enforcement provisions---are very different from any previous wealth tax. This makes it difficult to learn from experience, but we can gain insights from closely related taxes, such as the property and the estate tax.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper evaluates recent prominent proposals for an annual wealth tax. We point out why the former conventional wisdom—that an optimal tax system would feature no taxes on capital—has been overturned, and present a series of arguments that justify pro- gressive taxes on wealth accumulation both in the short and long run. We also discuss under which conditions they should take the form of a wealth tax versus alternative poli- cies that achieve similar objectives. While a dozen OECD countries levied wealth taxes in the recent past, now only three retain them, with only Switzerland raising a comparable fraction of revenue as the U.S. proposals. Studies of these taxes often find a substantial behavioral response, which may indicate a large excess burden. To predict the conse- quences of the U.S.-style proposals, however, one needs to take into account that their design features—especially the rate schedule, broadness of the base, and enforcement provisions—are very different from any previous wealth tax. This makes it difficult to learn from experience, but we can gain insights from closely related taxes, such as the property and the estate tax.

@techreport{BrzezinskiSalach2020,
  type = {Working {{Papers}}},
  title = {Why Wealth Inequality Differs between Post-Socialist Countries?},
  author = {Brzezi{\'n}ski, Micha{\l} and Sa{\l}ach, Katarzyna},
  year = {2020},
  number = {14/2020 (320)},
  institution = {University of Warsaw Faculty of Economic Sciences},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3631191},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3631191},
  abstract = {We provide the first attempt to understand how differences in households' sociodemographic and economic characteristics account for disparities in wealth inequality between five post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We use 2013/2014 data from the second wave of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) and the reweighted Oaxaca-Blinder-like decompositions based on recentered influence function (RIF) regressions. Our results show that the differences in homeownership rates account for up to 42\% of the difference in wealth inequality measured with the Gini index and for as much as 63-109\% in case of the P50/P25 percentile ratio. Differences in homeownership rates are related to alternative designs of housing tax policies but could be also driven by other factors. We correct for the problem of the `missing rich' in household surveys by calibrating the HFCS survey weights to top wealth shares adjusted using wealth data from national rich lists. Empirically, the correction procedure strengthens the importance of homeownership rates in accounting for cross-country wealth inequality differences, which suggests that our results are not sensitive to the significant underestimation of top wealth observations in the HFCS.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

We provide the first attempt to understand how differences in households' sociodemographic and economic characteristics account for disparities in wealth inequality between five post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We use 2013/2014 data from the second wave of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) and the reweighted Oaxaca-Blinder-like decompositions based on recentered influence function (RIF) regressions. Our results show that the differences in homeownership rates account for up to 42% of the difference in wealth inequality measured with the Gini index and for as much as 63-109% in case of the P50/P25 percentile ratio. Differences in homeownership rates are related to alternative designs of housing tax policies but could be also driven by other factors. We correct for the problem of the `missing rich' in household surveys by calibrating the HFCS survey weights to top wealth shares adjusted using wealth data from national rich lists. Empirically, the correction procedure strengthens the importance of homeownership rates in accounting for cross-country wealth inequality differences, which suggests that our results are not sensitive to the significant underestimation of top wealth observations in the HFCS.

@article{Fismanetal2020,
  title = {Do {{Americans}} Want to Tax Wealth? Evidence from Online Surveys},
  author = {Fisman, Raymond and Gladstone, Keith and Kuziemko, Ilyana and Naidu, Suresh},
  year = {2020},
  month = aug,
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {188},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104207},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104207},
  abstract = {A vast theoretical literature in public finance has studied the desirability of capital taxation. This discussion largely ignores the political feasibility of taxing wealth. We provide, to our knowledge, the first investigation of individuals' preferences over jointly taxing income and wealth. We provide subjects with a set of hypothetical individuals' incomes and wealth and elicit subjects' preferred (absolute) tax bill for each individual. Our method allows us to unobtrusively map both income earned and accumulated wealth into desired tax levels. Our regression results yield roughly linear desired tax rates on income of about 14\%. Respondents' suggested tax rates indicate positive desired wealth taxation. When we distinguish between sources of wealth we find that, in line with recent theoretical arguments, subjects' implied tax rate on wealth is 3\% when the source of wealth is inheritance, far higher than the 0.8\% rate when wealth is from savings. Textual analysis of respondents' justifications for their tax rates imply limited concern for the elasticity of tax bases with respect to net-of-tax rates.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {104207}
}

A vast theoretical literature in public finance has studied the desirability of capital taxation. This discussion largely ignores the political feasibility of taxing wealth. We provide, to our knowledge, the first investigation of individuals' preferences over jointly taxing income and wealth. We provide subjects with a set of hypothetical individuals' incomes and wealth and elicit subjects' preferred (absolute) tax bill for each individual. Our method allows us to unobtrusively map both income earned and accumulated wealth into desired tax levels. Our regression results yield roughly linear desired tax rates on income of about 14%. Respondents' suggested tax rates indicate positive desired wealth taxation. When we distinguish between sources of wealth we find that, in line with recent theoretical arguments, subjects' implied tax rate on wealth is 3% when the source of wealth is inheritance, far higher than the 0.8% rate when wealth is from savings. Textual analysis of respondents' justifications for their tax rates imply limited concern for the elasticity of tax bases with respect to net-of-tax rates.

@article{Grohetal2020,
  title = {Estate Taxes and Business Transfers across the Globe: A Configurational Analysis},
  author = {Groh, Maximilian and Scheef, Christine and Zellweger, Thomas Markus},
  year = {2020},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Academy of Management Proceedings},
  volume = {2020},
  number = {1},
  doi = {10.5465/AMBPP.2020.20992abstract},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2020.20992abstract},
  abstract = {Estate taxes on business inheritance are regularly the subject of controversial debates in business, politics and economics. However, a holistic understanding and systematic analysis of what shapes cross-national differences in estate taxes is missing. Using data from 54 countries, we present a comprehensive configurational analysis of socio-economic determinants of estate taxes. We reveal six distinct configurations of country-level entrepreneurial activity, business ownership, wealth inequality as well as cultural orientation towards individualism and the long term, which explain the presence of high or low estate taxes, and theorize around the institutional principles upon which societies draw to justify these estate taxes. Our analysis also highlights the importance of treating low and high estate taxes as separate outcomes since, for example, a country's entrepreneurial activity is less relevant than business ownership in configurations for high estate taxes, while the opposite is true for configurations for low estate taxes. Our study contributes a more nuanced understanding of the drivers of international variation in estate taxes and the particular role of entrepreneurs and business owners therein.},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth,Wealth Taxation}
}

Estate taxes on business inheritance are regularly the subject of controversial debates in business, politics and economics. However, a holistic understanding and systematic analysis of what shapes cross-national differences in estate taxes is missing. Using data from 54 countries, we present a comprehensive configurational analysis of socio-economic determinants of estate taxes. We reveal six distinct configurations of country-level entrepreneurial activity, business ownership, wealth inequality as well as cultural orientation towards individualism and the long term, which explain the presence of high or low estate taxes, and theorize around the institutional principles upon which societies draw to justify these estate taxes. Our analysis also highlights the importance of treating low and high estate taxes as separate outcomes since, for example, a country's entrepreneurial activity is less relevant than business ownership in configurations for high estate taxes, while the opposite is true for configurations for low estate taxes. Our study contributes a more nuanced understanding of the drivers of international variation in estate taxes and the particular role of entrepreneurs and business owners therein.

@article{Jakobsenetal2020,
  title = {Wealth Taxation and Wealth Accumulation: Theory and Evidence from {{Denmark}}},
  author = {Jakobsen, Katrine and Jakobsen, Kristian and Kleven, Henrik and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2020},
  month = feb,
  journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {135},
  number = {1},
  pages = {329--388},
  doi = {10.1093/qje/qjz032},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjz032},
  abstract = {Using administrative wealth records from Denmark, we study the effects of wealth taxes on wealth accumulation. Denmark used to impose one of the world's highest marginal tax rates on wealth, but this tax was greatly reduced starting in 1989 and later abolished. Due to the specific design of the wealth tax, the 1989 reform provides a compelling quasi-experiment for understanding behavioral responses among the wealthiest segments of the population. We find clear reduced-form effects of wealth taxes in the short and medium run, with larger effects on the very wealthy than on the moderately wealthy. We develop a simple life cycle model with utility of residual wealth (bequests) allowing us to interpret the evidence in terms of structural primitives. We calibrate the model to the quasi-experimental moments and simulate the model forward to estimate the long-run effect of wealth taxes on wealth accumulation. Our simulations show that the long-run elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the net-of-tax return is sizable at the top of the distribution.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  url_online_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/jakobsen-jakobsen-kleven-zucman-onlineappendixforwealthtaxationandwealthaccumulationtheoryandevidencefromdenmark-2020},
  url_replication_data = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/jakobsen-jakobsen-kleven-zucman-replicationdataforwealthtaxationandwealthaccumulationtheoryandevidencefromdenmark-2019}
}

Using administrative wealth records from Denmark, we study the effects of wealth taxes on wealth accumulation. Denmark used to impose one of the world's highest marginal tax rates on wealth, but this tax was greatly reduced starting in 1989 and later abolished. Due to the specific design of the wealth tax, the 1989 reform provides a compelling quasi-experiment for understanding behavioral responses among the wealthiest segments of the population. We find clear reduced-form effects of wealth taxes in the short and medium run, with larger effects on the very wealthy than on the moderately wealthy. We develop a simple life cycle model with utility of residual wealth (bequests) allowing us to interpret the evidence in terms of structural primitives. We calibrate the model to the quasi-experimental moments and simulate the model forward to estimate the long-run effect of wealth taxes on wealth accumulation. Our simulations show that the long-run elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the net-of-tax return is sizable at the top of the distribution.

@article{Johannesenetal2020,
  title = {Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of {{US}} Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts},
  author = {Johannesen, Niels and Langetieg, Patrick and Reck, Daniel and Risch, Max and Slemrod, Joel},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
  volume = {12},
  number = {3},
  pages = {312--346},
  doi = {10.1257/pol.20180410},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20180410},
  abstract = {In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers' reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about \$100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by \$2--\$4 billion, corresponding to \$0.6--\$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers' reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by$2–$4 billion, corresponding to$0.6–$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.

@book{Piketty2020,
  title = {Capital and Ideology},
  author = {PIketty, Thomas},
  translator = {Goldhammer, Arthur},
  year = {2020},
  publisher = {The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press},
  address = {Cambridge, MA},
  url = {http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/ideology},
  urldate = {2022-03-16},
  isbn = {978-0-674-24507-5},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Data Sources: Estate Inheritance and Gift Taxes,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Estate Inheritance and Gift Taxes,Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Wealth Taxation}
}

@unpublished{Smithetal2020,
  title = {Top Wealth in {{America}}: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich},
  author = {Smith, Matthew and Zidar, Owen and Zwick, Eric},
  year = {2020},
  month = apr,
  url = {http://ericzwick.com/},
  abstract = {This paper uses administrative tax data to estimate top wealth in the United States. We build on the capitalization approach in Saez and Zucman (2016) while accounting for heterogeneity within asset classes when mapping income flows to wealth. Our approach reduces bias in wealth estimates because wealth and rates of return are correlated. We find that the top 0.1\% share of wealth increased from 7\% to 14\% from 1978 to 2016. While this rise is half as large as prior estimates, wealth is very concentrated: the top 1\% holds nearly as much wealth as the bottom 90\%. However, the "P90-99" class holds more wealth than either group after accounting for heterogeneity. Private business and public equity wealth are the primary sources of wealth at the top, and pension and housing wealth account for almost all wealth of the bottom 90\%. Our approach substantially reduces estimates of mechanical wealth tax revenue and top capital income in distributional national accounts, which depend on well-measured estimates of top wealth. From 1980 to 2014, capital income accounts for 2.4 out of 8.1 percentage points of the rise of the top 1\% income share.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  url_file = {Smithetal2020.pdf},
  url_published_version = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/smith-zidar-zwick-topwealthinamericanewestimatesunderheterogeneousreturns-2023},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper uses administrative tax data to estimate top wealth in the United States. We build on the capitalization approach in Saez and Zucman (2016) while accounting for heterogeneity within asset classes when mapping income flows to wealth. Our approach reduces bias in wealth estimates because wealth and rates of return are correlated. We find that the top 0.1% share of wealth increased from 7% to 14% from 1978 to 2016. While this rise is half as large as prior estimates, wealth is very concentrated: the top 1% holds nearly as much wealth as the bottom 90%. However, the "P90-99" class holds more wealth than either group after accounting for heterogeneity. Private business and public equity wealth are the primary sources of wealth at the top, and pension and housing wealth account for almost all wealth of the bottom 90%. Our approach substantially reduces estimates of mechanical wealth tax revenue and top capital income in distributional national accounts, which depend on well-measured estimates of top wealth. From 1980 to 2014, capital income accounts for 2.4 out of 8.1 percentage points of the rise of the top 1% income share.

@article{StrandMirkay2020,
  title = {Racialized Tax Inequity: Wealth, Racism, and the {{U}}.{{S}}. System of Taxation},
  author = {Strand, Palma Joy and Mirkay, Nicholas A.},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Northwestern Journal of Law \& Social Policy},
  volume = {15},
  number = {3},
  pages = {265},
  url = {https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol15/iss3/1},
  urldate = {2024-05-29},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Estate Inheritance and Gift Taxes,Wealth Taxation}
}

@article{Alstadsaeteretal2019,
  title = {Tax Evasion and Inequality},
  author = {Alstads{\ae}ter, Annette and Johannesen, Niels and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {109},
  number = {6},
  pages = {2073--2103},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20172043},
  url = {https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20172043},
  abstract = {Drawing on a unique dataset of leaked customer lists from offshore financial institutions matched to administrative wealth records in Scandinavia, we show that offshore tax evasion is highly concentrated among the rich. The skewed distribution of offshore wealth implies high rates of tax evasion at the top: we find that the 0.01 percent richest households evade about 25 percent of their taxes. By contrast, tax evasion detected in stratified random tax audits is less than 5 percent throughout the distribution. Top wealth shares increase substantially when accounting for unreported assets, highlighting the importance of factoring in tax evasion to properly measure inequality.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

Drawing on a unique dataset of leaked customer lists from offshore financial institutions matched to administrative wealth records in Scandinavia, we show that offshore tax evasion is highly concentrated among the rich. The skewed distribution of offshore wealth implies high rates of tax evasion at the top: we find that the 0.01 percent richest households evade about 25 percent of their taxes. By contrast, tax evasion detected in stratified random tax audits is less than 5 percent throughout the distribution. Top wealth shares increase substantially when accounting for unreported assets, highlighting the importance of factoring in tax evasion to properly measure inequality.

@article{BatchelderKamin2019,
  title = {Taxing the Rich: Issues and Options},
  author = {Batchelder, Lily L. and Kamin, David},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {SSRN Electronic Journal},
  pages = {1--51},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3452274},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3452274},
  abstract = {The U.S. economy exhibits high inequality and low economic mobility across generations relative to other high-income countries. The U.S. will need to raise more revenues in order to reduce these disparities, finance much-needed new services and investments, and address the nation's long-term fiscal needs. This paper outlines policy options for raising a large amount of revenues primarily from the most affluent, first discussing potential incremental reforms and then focusing on four main options for more structural reform: (1) dramatically increasing the top tax rates on labor and other ordinary income, (2) taxing the wealthy on accrued gains as they arise and at ordinary rates, (3) a wealth tax on high-net-worth individuals, and (4) a financial transactions tax. Although we summarize the relative advantages and disadvantages of these approaches, we generally conclude that they all merit serious consideration. Several options are also complementary to one another. In practice, however, the relative strengths of each of these policies will depend to a large extent on how each is designed after it has made its way through the legislative and regulatory process.},
  keywords = {Estate Inheritance and Gift Taxes,Wealth Taxation}
}

The U.S. economy exhibits high inequality and low economic mobility across generations relative to other high-income countries. The U.S. will need to raise more revenues in order to reduce these disparities, finance much-needed new services and investments, and address the nation's long-term fiscal needs. This paper outlines policy options for raising a large amount of revenues primarily from the most affluent, first discussing potential incremental reforms and then focusing on four main options for more structural reform: (1) dramatically increasing the top tax rates on labor and other ordinary income, (2) taxing the wealthy on accrued gains as they arise and at ordinary rates, (3) a wealth tax on high-net-worth individuals, and (4) a financial transactions tax. Although we summarize the relative advantages and disadvantages of these approaches, we generally conclude that they all merit serious consideration. Several options are also complementary to one another. In practice, however, the relative strengths of each of these policies will depend to a large extent on how each is designed after it has made its way through the legislative and regulatory process.

@techreport{Duran-Cabreetal2019,
  type = {{{IEB Working Paper}}},
  title = {Behavioural Responses to the (Re)Introduction of Wealth Taxes. Evidence from {{Spain}}},
  author = {{Duran-Cabr{\'e}}, Jos{\'e} Mar{\'i}a and {Esteller-Mor{\'e}}, Alejandro and {Mas-Montserrat}, Mariona},
  year = {2019},
  number = {2019/04},
  institution = {Institut d'Economia de Barcelona},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3393016},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3393016},
  abstract = {In the throes of economic crisis, the Spanish government decided to reintroduce the Wealth Tax, appealing to redistributive motives and its need for greater revenues. This paper studies how individuals reacted to the reintroduction of this tax by drawing on the universe of wealth tax returns submitted to the Catalan Tax Agency between 2011 and 2015. Thus, we exploit the variation in treatment exposure to analyse taxpayers' responses, in terms not only of wealth accumulation, but also of the potential avoidance strategies adopted. Indeed, our results reflect avoidance rather than real responses. They show that while facing higher wealth taxes did not have a negative effect on taxpayers' savings, it did encourage them to change their asset and income composition to take advantage of wealth tax exemptions (mostly business-related) and the existence of a limit on wealth tax liability. This translates into an elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return of 0.64, or, put differently, a 0.1 percentage point increase in the average wealth tax rate leads to a reduction in taxable wealth of 3.24\% over 4 years. Overall, these avoidance responses are quite marked in terms of tax revenues: they represent a 4-year accumulated revenue loss of 2.6 times the 2011 estimated wealth tax revenues. The existence of such responses mostly related to the design of the wealth tax has relevant policy implications not only in terms of revenues but also insofar as it undermines the tax's redistributive role.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

In the throes of economic crisis, the Spanish government decided to reintroduce the Wealth Tax, appealing to redistributive motives and its need for greater revenues. This paper studies how individuals reacted to the reintroduction of this tax by drawing on the universe of wealth tax returns submitted to the Catalan Tax Agency between 2011 and 2015. Thus, we exploit the variation in treatment exposure to analyse taxpayers' responses, in terms not only of wealth accumulation, but also of the potential avoidance strategies adopted. Indeed, our results reflect avoidance rather than real responses. They show that while facing higher wealth taxes did not have a negative effect on taxpayers' savings, it did encourage them to change their asset and income composition to take advantage of wealth tax exemptions (mostly business-related) and the existence of a limit on wealth tax liability. This translates into an elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return of 0.64, or, put differently, a 0.1 percentage point increase in the average wealth tax rate leads to a reduction in taxable wealth of 3.24% over 4 years. Overall, these avoidance responses are quite marked in terms of tax revenues: they represent a 4-year accumulated revenue loss of 2.6 times the 2011 estimated wealth tax revenues. The existence of such responses mostly related to the design of the wealth tax has relevant policy implications not only in terms of revenues but also insofar as it undermines the tax's redistributive role.

@article{Pikettyetal2019,
  title = {Capital Accumulation, Private Property, and Rising Inequality in {{China}}, 1978--2015},
  author = {Piketty, Thomas and Yang, Li and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2019},
  month = jul,
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {109},
  number = {7},
  pages = {2469--2496},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20170973},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170973},
  abstract = {We combine national accounts, surveys, and new tax data to study the accumulation and distribution of income and wealth in China from 1978 to 2015. The national wealth-income ratio increased from 350 percent in 1978 to 700 percent in 2015, while the share of public property in national wealth declined from 70 percent to 30 percent. We provide sharp upward revision of official inequality estimates. The top 10 percent income share rose from 27 percent to 41 percent between 1978 and 2015; the bottom 50 percent share dropped from 27 percent to 15 percent. China's inequality levels used to be close to Nordic countries and are now approaching US levels.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  url_online_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/piketty-yang-zucman-capitalaccumulationprivatepropertyandrisinginequalityinchina19782015onlineappendix-2018},
  url_data_files = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/piketty-yang-zucman-capitalaccumulationprivatepropertyandrisinginequalityinchina19782015datafiles-2018}
}

We combine national accounts, surveys, and new tax data to study the accumulation and distribution of income and wealth in China from 1978 to 2015. The national wealth-income ratio increased from 350 percent in 1978 to 700 percent in 2015, while the share of public property in national wealth declined from 70 percent to 30 percent. We provide sharp upward revision of official inequality estimates. The top 10 percent income share rose from 27 percent to 41 percent between 1978 and 2015; the bottom 50 percent share dropped from 27 percent to 15 percent. China's inequality levels used to be close to Nordic countries and are now approaching US levels.

@article{SaezZucman2019,
  title = {Progressive Wealth Taxation},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Brookings Paper on Economic Activity},
  volume = {Fall},
  pages = {437--533},
  doi = {10.1353/eca.2019.0017},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2019.0017},
  abstract = {This paper discusses the progressive taxation of household wealth. We first discuss what wealth is, how it is distributed, and how much revenue a progressive wealth tax could generate in the United States. We try to reconcile discrepancies across wealth data sources. Second, we discuss the role a wealth tax can play to increase the overall progressivity of the U.S. tax system. Third, we discuss the empirical evidence on wealth tax avoidance and evasion as well as tax enforcement policies. We summarize the key elements needed to make a U.S. wealth tax work in light of the experience of other countries. Fourth, we discuss the real economic effects of wealth taxation on inequality, the capital stock, and economic activity. Fifth, we present a simple tractable model of the taxation of billionaires' wealth that can be applied to the Forbes list of the four hundred richest Americans since 1982 to illustrate the long-run effects of concrete wealth tax proposals on top fortunes.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  url_data_file = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/saez-zucman-progressivewealthtaxationdatafile-2019}
}

This paper discusses the progressive taxation of household wealth. We first discuss what wealth is, how it is distributed, and how much revenue a progressive wealth tax could generate in the United States. We try to reconcile discrepancies across wealth data sources. Second, we discuss the role a wealth tax can play to increase the overall progressivity of the U.S. tax system. Third, we discuss the empirical evidence on wealth tax avoidance and evasion as well as tax enforcement policies. We summarize the key elements needed to make a U.S. wealth tax work in light of the experience of other countries. Fourth, we discuss the real economic effects of wealth taxation on inequality, the capital stock, and economic activity. Fifth, we present a simple tractable model of the taxation of billionaires' wealth that can be applied to the Forbes list of the four hundred richest Americans since 1982 to illustrate the long-run effects of concrete wealth tax proposals on top fortunes.

@unpublished{SaezZucman2019a,
  title = {How Would a Progressive Wealth Tax Work? Evidence from the Economics Literature},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2019},
  month = feb,
  url = {http://gabriel-zucman.eu/},
  urldate = {2024-05-29},
  abstract = {Senator Elizabeth Warren recently proposed a new wealth tax on the richest Americans. Though the United States does not have a wealth tax, a number of countries around the world have or had progressive wealth taxes. In this paper, we discuss the merits and demerits of progressive wealth taxation in light of the international experience and economic theory. In short, a progressive wealth tax focused on the ultra-wealthy (households with more than \$50 million in net wealth) could raise substantial revenues and the economic incidence of the tax would lie overwhelmingly on the richest families. After defining what a progressive wealth tax is, in section 2 we discuss issues of tax avoidance and evasion; in section 3 we discuss the real effects of wealth taxation on the economy; and in section 4 we make concrete proposals to administer a progressive wealth tax effectively in the United States.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Senator Elizabeth Warren recently proposed a new wealth tax on the richest Americans. Though the United States does not have a wealth tax, a number of countries around the world have or had progressive wealth taxes. In this paper, we discuss the merits and demerits of progressive wealth taxation in light of the international experience and economic theory. In short, a progressive wealth tax focused on the ultra-wealthy (households with more than $50 million in net wealth) could raise substantial revenues and the economic incidence of the tax would lie overwhelmingly on the richest families. After defining what a progressive wealth tax is, in section 2 we discuss issues of tax avoidance and evasion; in section 3 we discuss the real effects of wealth taxation on the economy; and in section 4 we make concrete proposals to administer a progressive wealth tax effectively in the United States.

@techreport{Vellutinietal2019,
  type = {Taxation {{Paper}}},
  title = {Estimating International Tax Evasion by Individuals},
  author = {Vellutini, Charles and Casamatta, Georges and Bousquet, L{\'e}a and Poniatowski, Grzegorz},
  year = {2019},
  month = sep,
  number = {76},
  institution = {{European Commission's Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union}},
  doi = {10.2778/300732},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.2778/300732},
  abstract = {This study provides estimates of offshore wealth held by individuals (for the world's main economies) and corresponding estimates of international tax evasion (for the EU and EU Member States). Following the literature, the methodology relies on public statistics published by international organisations. Several additions to the standard approach are proposed including (i) estimates of offshore wealth held indirectly through shell companies, based on the identification of ``Type II'' international financial centres (defined as jurisdictions providing shell companies and similar devices); (ii) the use of foreign direct investment data to improve on available statistics for cross-borders deposits. Key results are as follows. The global offshore wealth is estimated at USD 7.8 trillion in 2016 (EUR 7.5 trillion) or 10.4\% of global GDP, a considerable amount. This estimate is largely consistent with existing published valuations. The EU share is valued at USD 1.6 trillion (EUR 1.5 trillion), or 9.7\% of GDP. The corresponding EU estimated revenue lost to international tax evasion is EUR 46 billion in 2016 (0.32\% of GDP). Among Member states, there is a great deal of heterogeneity, both in monetary terms of the estimated offshore wealth (and the corresponding tax evasion) and in GDP percentages of the same.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Wealth Taxation}
}

This study provides estimates of offshore wealth held by individuals (for the world's main economies) and corresponding estimates of international tax evasion (for the EU and EU Member States). Following the literature, the methodology relies on public statistics published by international organisations. Several additions to the standard approach are proposed including (i) estimates of offshore wealth held indirectly through shell companies, based on the identification of ``Type II'' international financial centres (defined as jurisdictions providing shell companies and similar devices); (ii) the use of foreign direct investment data to improve on available statistics for cross-borders deposits. Key results are as follows. The global offshore wealth is estimated at USD 7.8 trillion in 2016 (EUR 7.5 trillion) or 10.4% of global GDP, a considerable amount. This estimate is largely consistent with existing published valuations. The EU share is valued at USD 1.6 trillion (EUR 1.5 trillion), or 9.7% of GDP. The corresponding EU estimated revenue lost to international tax evasion is EUR 46 billion in 2016 (0.32% of GDP). Among Member states, there is a great deal of heterogeneity, both in monetary terms of the estimated offshore wealth (and the corresponding tax evasion) and in GDP percentages of the same.

@article{Alstadsaeteretal2018,
  title = {Who Owns the Wealth in Tax Havens? {{Macro}} Evidence and Implications for Global Inequality},
  author = {Alstads{\ae}ter, Annette and Johannesen, Niels and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {162},
  pages = {89--100},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.008},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.008},
  abstract = {Drawing on newly published macroeconomic statistics, this paper estimates the amount of household wealth owned by each country in offshore tax havens. The equivalent of 10\% of world GDP is held in tax havens globally, but this average masks a great deal of heterogeneity---from a few percent of GDP in Scandinavia, to about 15\% in Continental Europe, and 60\% in Gulf countries and some Latin American economies. We use these estimates to construct revised series of top wealth shares in ten countries, which account for close to half of world GDP. Because offshore wealth is very concentrated at the top, accounting for it increases the top 0.01\% wealth share substantially in Europe, even in countries that do not use tax havens extensively. It has considerable effects in Russia, where the vast majority of wealth at the top is held offshore. These results highlight the importance of looking beyond tax and survey data to study wealth accumulation among the very rich in a globalized world.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

Drawing on newly published macroeconomic statistics, this paper estimates the amount of household wealth owned by each country in offshore tax havens. The equivalent of 10% of world GDP is held in tax havens globally, but this average masks a great deal of heterogeneity—from a few percent of GDP in Scandinavia, to about 15% in Continental Europe, and 60% in Gulf countries and some Latin American economies. We use these estimates to construct revised series of top wealth shares in ten countries, which account for close to half of world GDP. Because offshore wealth is very concentrated at the top, accounting for it increases the top 0.01% wealth share substantially in Europe, even in countries that do not use tax havens extensively. It has considerable effects in Russia, where the vast majority of wealth at the top is held offshore. These results highlight the importance of looking beyond tax and survey data to study wealth accumulation among the very rich in a globalized world.

@article{Boserupetal2018,
  title = {Born with a Silver Spoon? {{Danish}} Evidence on Wealth Inequality in Childhood},
  author = {Boserup, Simon Halphen and Kopczuk, Wojciech and Kreiner, Claus Thustrup},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {128},
  number = {612},
  pages = {F514--F544},
  doi = {10.1111/ecoj.12496},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12496},
  abstract = {We use Danish wealth records from three decades to characterise wealth inequality in childhood, where the main source of wealth is transfers. Wealth holdings are small in childhood but they have strong predictive power for future wealth in adulthood. At age 18, asset holdings of children are more informative than parental wealth in predicting wealth of children when they are in their 40s. We investigate why and rule out that childhood wealth in itself can accumulate enough to explain later wealth inequality. Instead, childhood wealth seems to proxy for intergenerational correlation in savings behaviour and additional transfers from parents.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Wealth Taxation}
}

We use Danish wealth records from three decades to characterise wealth inequality in childhood, where the main source of wealth is transfers. Wealth holdings are small in childhood but they have strong predictive power for future wealth in adulthood. At age 18, asset holdings of children are more informative than parental wealth in predicting wealth of children when they are in their 40s. We investigate why and rule out that childhood wealth in itself can accumulate enough to explain later wealth inequality. Instead, childhood wealth seems to proxy for intergenerational correlation in savings behaviour and additional transfers from parents.

@article{Elinderetal2018,
  title = {Inheritance and Wealth Inequality: Evidence from Population Registers},
  author = {Elinder, Mikael and Erixson, Oscar and Waldenstr{\"o}m, Daniel},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {165},
  pages = {17--30},
  doi = {10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2018.06.012},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.06.012},
  abstract = {This paper uses population register data on inheritances and wealth in Sweden to estimate the causal impact of inheritances on wealth inequality. We find that inheritances reduce wealth inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient or top wealth shares, but that they increase absolute dispersion. This duality in effects stems from the fact that even though richer heirs inherit larger amounts, the relative importance of the inheritance is larger for less wealthy heirs, who inherit more relative to their pre-inheritance wealth. This is in part driven by the fact that heirs do not inherit debts, which makes the distribution of inheritances more equal than the distribution of wealth among the heirs. Behavioral adjustments seem to mitigate the equalizing effect of inheritances, possibly through higher consumption among the poorer heirs. Inheritance taxation counteracts the equalizing inheritance effect, but redistribution of inheritance tax revenues can reverse this result and make the inheritance tax equalizing. Finally, we also find that inheritances increase intragenerational wealth mobility, but the effect is short-lived.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper uses population register data on inheritances and wealth in Sweden to estimate the causal impact of inheritances on wealth inequality. We find that inheritances reduce wealth inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient or top wealth shares, but that they increase absolute dispersion. This duality in effects stems from the fact that even though richer heirs inherit larger amounts, the relative importance of the inheritance is larger for less wealthy heirs, who inherit more relative to their pre-inheritance wealth. This is in part driven by the fact that heirs do not inherit debts, which makes the distribution of inheritances more equal than the distribution of wealth among the heirs. Behavioral adjustments seem to mitigate the equalizing effect of inheritances, possibly through higher consumption among the poorer heirs. Inheritance taxation counteracts the equalizing inheritance effect, but redistribution of inheritance tax revenues can reverse this result and make the inheritance tax equalizing. Finally, we also find that inheritances increase intragenerational wealth mobility, but the effect is short-lived.

@article{JohnsenDellinger2018,
  title = {The Constitutionality of a National Wealth Tax},
  author = {Johnsen, Dawn and Dellinger, Walter},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Indiana Law Journal},
  volume = {93},
  number = {1},
  pages = {111--137},
  url = {https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol93/iss1/8},
  abstract = {The United States needs innovative approaches to help rebuild foundational, shared understandings of American democracy, the American Dream, and opportunity and fairness. Tax policy provides one central context in which collective judgments about fundamental values help form national identity. We believe that a national wealth tax (that is, a tax on individuals' net worth) should be among the policy options under consideration to support vital infrastructure, social service, and other governmental functions. Although not a new concept, a wealth tax may be an idea whose time has come, as inequality soars toward record highs. Our aim in this Essay is to help ensure that a wealth tax is among the policy options available to Congress by challenging a common assumption that has unduly harmed its prospects: the belief that the U.S. Constitution effectively makes a national wealth tax impossible. We believe this conventional wisdom is wrong and its casual repetition has been harmful. Devising a progressive tax system that effectively taxes the wealthy is notoriously difficult, but whether a wealth tax is part of that system should depend upon the policy choices of democratically elected representatives, not faulty constitutional understandings.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

The United States needs innovative approaches to help rebuild foundational, shared understandings of American democracy, the American Dream, and opportunity and fairness. Tax policy provides one central context in which collective judgments about fundamental values help form national identity. We believe that a national wealth tax (that is, a tax on individuals' net worth) should be among the policy options under consideration to support vital infrastructure, social service, and other governmental functions. Although not a new concept, a wealth tax may be an idea whose time has come, as inequality soars toward record highs. Our aim in this Essay is to help ensure that a wealth tax is among the policy options available to Congress by challenging a common assumption that has unduly harmed its prospects: the belief that the U.S. Constitution effectively makes a national wealth tax impossible. We believe this conventional wisdom is wrong and its casual repetition has been harmful. Devising a progressive tax system that effectively taxes the wealthy is notoriously difficult, but whether a wealth tax is part of that system should depend upon the policy choices of democratically elected representatives, not faulty constitutional understandings.

@article{SaezStantcheva2018,
  title = {A Simpler Theory of Optimal Capital Taxation},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Stantcheva, Stefanie},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {162},
  pages = {120--142},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.10.004},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.10.004},
  abstract = {This paper develops a theory of optimal capital taxation that expresses optimal tax formulas in sufficient statistics. We first consider a simple model with utility functions linear in consumption and featuring heterogeneous utility for wealth. In this case, there are no transitional dynamics, the steady-state is reached immediately and has finite elasticities of capital with respect to the net-of-tax rate. This allows for a tractable optimal tax analysis with formulas expressed in terms of empirical elasticities and social preferences that can address many important policy questions. These formulas can easily be taken to the data to simulate optimal taxes, which we do using U.S. tax return data on labor and capital incomes. Second, we show how these results can be extended to the case with concave utility for consumption. The same types of formulas carry over by appropriately defining elasticities. We show that one can recover all the results from the simpler model using a new and non standard steady state approach that respects individual preferences even with a fully general utility function.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper develops a theory of optimal capital taxation that expresses optimal tax formulas in sufficient statistics. We first consider a simple model with utility functions linear in consumption and featuring heterogeneous utility for wealth. In this case, there are no transitional dynamics, the steady-state is reached immediately and has finite elasticities of capital with respect to the net-of-tax rate. This allows for a tractable optimal tax analysis with formulas expressed in terms of empirical elasticities and social preferences that can address many important policy questions. These formulas can easily be taken to the data to simulate optimal taxes, which we do using U.S. tax return data on labor and capital incomes. Second, we show how these results can be extended to the case with concave utility for consumption. The same types of formulas carry over by appropriately defining elasticities. We show that one can recover all the results from the simpler model using a new and non standard steady state approach that respects individual preferences even with a fully general utility function.

@techreport{Humeretal2017,
  type = {{{ICAE Working Paper Series}}},
  title = {Inheritances and the Accumulation of Wealth in the {{Eurozone}}},
  author = {Humer, Stefan and Moser, Mathias and Schnetzer, Matthias},
  year = {2017},
  number = {73},
  institution = {Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy},
  url = {https://hdl.handle.net/10419/179436},
  abstract = {This paper empirically compares the contribution of the two major wealth accumulation factors - earned income and inheritances - to the within country net wealth position of Eurozone households with HFCS data. Using unconditional quantile regressions, we show the varying importance of earned income and inheritances at different parts of the per country distributions and compare them to Eurozone averages. The elasticities of both wealth sources are overly non-linear and display an inverted "U" shape pattern. Around the median household, an additional percentile in the income distribution corresponds to an increase in the net wealth distribution of as much as 0:5 percentiles, while an additional percentile in the inheritance distribution yields up to 1:3 percentiles. At the bottom of the wealth distribution, households have to climb less than two percentiles in the income distribution to compensate a one percentile increase in the inheritance distribution, whereas this ratio surges to almost four percentiles at the top tail and varies distinctively between different countries. These results emphasize the relative importance of inheritances versus income from employment for private wealth creation and question common perceptions of meritocracy.},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Intergenerational Wealth,Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper empirically compares the contribution of the two major wealth accumulation factors - earned income and inheritances - to the within country net wealth position of Eurozone households with HFCS data. Using unconditional quantile regressions, we show the varying importance of earned income and inheritances at different parts of the per country distributions and compare them to Eurozone averages. The elasticities of both wealth sources are overly non-linear and display an inverted "U" shape pattern. Around the median household, an additional percentile in the income distribution corresponds to an increase in the net wealth distribution of as much as 0:5 percentiles, while an additional percentile in the inheritance distribution yields up to 1:3 percentiles. At the bottom of the wealth distribution, households have to climb less than two percentiles in the income distribution to compensate a one percentile increase in the inheritance distribution, whereas this ratio surges to almost four percentiles at the top tail and varies distinctively between different countries. These results emphasize the relative importance of inheritances versus income from employment for private wealth creation and question common perceptions of meritocracy.

@unpublished{Kumar2017,
  title = {Capital and the {{Hindu}} Rate of Growth: Wealth Concentration in Newly Independent {{India}} 1961-1986},
  author = {Kumar, Rishabh},
  year = {2017},
  month = aug,
  url = {https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/economics-publications/3/},
  urldate = {2024-05-29},
  abstract = {I provide estimates for the size and importance of top wealth-holders in India during the stagnant growth phase before the early 1990s liberalization. Relative to national income which famously grew at The Hindu Rate of Growth, my paper suggests a large and fast decline in the wealth of India's Top 0.1\%. Due to the effects of inflation, progressive property taxation and nationalization much of incumbent private wealth was dismantled. New wealth was made of movable assets which unlike urban and agricultural land actually recovered in value. I offer explanations of these transformative dynamics based on the attitudes of the Indian state during and prior to the reign of Indira Gandhi. The results link the composition of the rich in colonial India versus post-liberalization India with important implications for wealth inequality, the equalizing forces inherent in tax policy and the role of the state in regulating social disparities.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Estate Inheritance and Gift Taxes,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

I provide estimates for the size and importance of top wealth-holders in India during the stagnant growth phase before the early 1990s liberalization. Relative to national income which famously grew at The Hindu Rate of Growth, my paper suggests a large and fast decline in the wealth of India's Top 0.1%. Due to the effects of inflation, progressive property taxation and nationalization much of incumbent private wealth was dismantled. New wealth was made of movable assets which unlike urban and agricultural land actually recovered in value. I offer explanations of these transformative dynamics based on the attitudes of the Indian state during and prior to the reign of Indira Gandhi. The results link the composition of the rich in colonial India versus post-liberalization India with important implications for wealth inequality, the equalizing forces inherent in tax policy and the role of the state in regulating social disparities.

@article{Seim2017,
  title = {Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from {{Sweden}}},
  author = {Seim, David},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
  volume = {9},
  number = {4},
  pages = {395--421},
  doi = {10.1257/pol.20150290},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150290},
  abstract = {This paper provides an empirical assessment of an annual wealth tax. Using Swedish administrative data, I estimate net-of-tax-rate elas-ticities of taxable wealth in the range [0.09, 0.27]. Cross-checking self-reported assets against asset data unavailable to the tax agency reveals that around a third of the elasticity estimates are due to underreporting of asset values. Difference-indifference designs further suggest that the responses reflect evasion and avoidance rather than changes in saving.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper provides an empirical assessment of an annual wealth tax. Using Swedish administrative data, I estimate net-of-tax-rate elas-ticities of taxable wealth in the range [0.09, 0.27]. Cross-checking self-reported assets against asset data unavailable to the tax agency reveals that around a third of the elasticity estimates are due to underreporting of asset values. Difference-indifference designs further suggest that the responses reflect evasion and avoidance rather than changes in saving.

@article{Cooperetal2016,
  title = {Business in the United States: Who Owns It, and How Much Tax Do They Pay?},
  author = {Cooper, Michael and McClelland, John and Pearce, James and Prisinzano, Richard and Sullivan, Joseph and Yagan, Danny and Zidar, Owen and Zwick, Eric},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Tax Policy and the Economy},
  volume = {30},
  number = {1},
  pages = {91--128},
  publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
  doi = {10.1086/685594},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1086/685594},
  abstract = {``Pass-through'' businesses like partnerships and S-corporations now generate over half of U.S. business income and account for much of the post-1980 rise in the top- 1\% income share. We use administrative tax data from 2011 to identify pass-through business owners and estimate how much tax they pay. We present three findings. (1) Relative to traditional business income, pass-through business income is substantially more concentrated among high-earners. (2) Partnership ownership is opaque: 20\% of the income goes to unclassifiable partners, and 15\% of the income is earned in circularly owned partnerships. (3) The average federal income tax rate on U.S. pass- through business income is 19\%{\textbar}much lower than the average rate on traditional corporations. If pass-through activity had remained at 1980's low level, strong but straightforward assumptions imply that the 2011 average U.S. tax rate on total U.S. business income would have been 28\% rather than 24\%, and tax revenue would have been approximately 100 billion higher.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

``Pass-through'' businesses like partnerships and S-corporations now generate over half of U.S. business income and account for much of the post-1980 rise in the top- 1% income share. We use administrative tax data from 2011 to identify pass-through business owners and estimate how much tax they pay. We present three findings. (1) Relative to traditional business income, pass-through business income is substantially more concentrated among high-earners. (2) Partnership ownership is opaque: 20% of the income goes to unclassifiable partners, and 15% of the income is earned in circularly owned partnerships. (3) The average federal income tax rate on U.S. pass- through business income is 19%\textbarmuch lower than the average rate on traditional corporations. If pass-through activity had remained at 1980's low level, strong but straightforward assumptions imply that the 2011 average U.S. tax rate on total U.S. business income would have been 28% rather than 24%, and tax revenue would have been approximately 100 billion higher.

@book{Harrington2016,
  title = {Capital without Borders: Wealth Managers and the One Percent},
  author = {Harrington, Brooke},
  year = {2016},
  publisher = {Harvard University Press},
  url = {https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674743809},
  abstract = {Capital without Borders reveals how wealth managers use offshore banks, shell corporations, and trusts to shield billions in private wealth not only from taxation but from all manner of legal obligations. And it shows how practitioners justify their work, despite evidence that it erodes government authority and contributes to global inequality.},
  isbn = {978-0-674-24477-1},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Wealth Taxation}
}

Capital without Borders reveals how wealth managers use offshore banks, shell corporations, and trusts to shield billions in private wealth not only from taxation but from all manner of legal obligations. And it shows how practitioners justify their work, despite evidence that it erodes government authority and contributes to global inequality.

@techreport{Pellegrinietal2016,
  type = {Occasional {{Papers}}},
  title = {What Do External Statistics Tell Us about Undeclared Assets Held Abroad and Tax Evasion?},
  author = {Pellegrini, Valeria and Sanelli, Alessandra and Tosti, Enrico},
  year = {2016},
  month = nov,
  number = {367},
  institution = {Bank of Italy},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2917184},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2917184},
  abstract = {The analysis of international investment position and balance of payments statistics suggests that foreign assets held abroad are greatly underestimated. This paper has three main goals. First, it examines the role played by tax havens in tax evasion. Second, it estimates unreported capital to range globally between \$6 trillion and \$7 trillion at end-2013, on the basis of mirror statistics on portfolio securities and on cross-border deposits of non-banks. Third, it estimates the portion of tax evasion connected to the under-reporting of foreign assets to range between \$20 billion and \$42 billion a year over the period 2001-2013 for capital income tax, and between \$2.1 trillion and \$2.8 trillion at end-2013 for personal income tax. The estimate for personal income tax is based on the assumption that the entire stock of unreported capital outstanding at end-2013 was made up of income that had escaped income tax. Finally, the paper gives a critical assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the recent policy responses to international tax evasion.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

The analysis of international investment position and balance of payments statistics suggests that foreign assets held abroad are greatly underestimated. This paper has three main goals. First, it examines the role played by tax havens in tax evasion. Second, it estimates unreported capital to range globally between $6 trillion and$7 trillion at end-2013, on the basis of mirror statistics on portfolio securities and on cross-border deposits of non-banks. Third, it estimates the portion of tax evasion connected to the under-reporting of foreign assets to range between $20 billion and$42 billion a year over the period 2001-2013 for capital income tax, and between $2.1 trillion and$2.8 trillion at end-2013 for personal income tax. The estimate for personal income tax is based on the assumption that the entire stock of unreported capital outstanding at end-2013 was made up of income that had escaped income tax. Finally, the paper gives a critical assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the recent policy responses to international tax evasion.

@article{RosenthalAustin2016,
  title = {The Dwindling Taxable Share of {{U}}.{{S}}. Corporate Stock},
  author = {Rosenthal, Steven M. and Austin, Lydia S.},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Tax Notes},
  volume = {151},
  number = {6},
  pages = {923--934},
  doi = {10.1161/STROKEAHA.115.008782},
  url = {https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/dwindling-taxable-share-us-corporate-stock},
  abstract = {In this report, Rosenthal and Austin demonstrate that the share of U.S. stocks held by taxable ac- counts has declined sharply over the last 50 years, and they urge lawmakers to carefully consider this shareholder base erosion when determining how best to tax corporate earnings.},
  isbn = {8175481358},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

In this report, Rosenthal and Austin demonstrate that the share of U.S. stocks held by taxable ac- counts has declined sharply over the last 50 years, and they urge lawmakers to carefully consider this shareholder base erosion when determining how best to tax corporate earnings.

@article{SaezZucman2016,
  title = {Wealth Inequality in the {{United States}} since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data},
  author = {Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2016},
  month = may,
  journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {131},
  number = {2},
  pages = {519--578},
  doi = {10.1093/qje/qjw004},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw004},
  abstract = {This paper combines income tax returns with macroeconomic household balance sheets to estimate the distribution of wealth in the United States since 1913. We estimate wealth by capitalizing the incomes reported by individual taxpayers, accounting for assets that do not generate taxable income. We successfully test our capitalization method in three micro datasets where we can observe both income and wealth: the Survey of Consumer Finance, linked estate and income tax returns, and foundations' tax records. We find that wealth concentration was high in the beginning of the twentieth century, fell from 1929 to 1978, and has continuously increased since then. The top 0.1\% wealth share has risen from 7\% in 1978 to 22\% in 2012, a level almost as high as in 1929. Top wealth-holders are younger today than in the 1960s and earn a higher fraction of the economy's labor income. The bottom 90\% wealth share first increased up to the mid-1980s and then steadily declined. The increase in wealth inequality in recent decades is due to the upsurge of top incomes combined with an increase in saving rate inequality. We explain how our findings can be reconciled with Survey of Consumer Finances and estate tax data.},
  keywords = {Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  url_working_paper = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/saez-zucman-wealthinequalityintheunitedstatessince1913evidencefromcapitalizedincometaxdata-2014},
  url_online_appendix = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/saez-zucman-onlineappendixofwealthinequalityintheunitedstatessince1913evidencefromcapitalizedincometaxdata-2015},
  url_main_data = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/saez-zucman-wealthinequalityintheunitedstatessince1913evidencefromcapitalizedincometaxdatamaindata-2015}
}

This paper combines income tax returns with macroeconomic household balance sheets to estimate the distribution of wealth in the United States since 1913. We estimate wealth by capitalizing the incomes reported by individual taxpayers, accounting for assets that do not generate taxable income. We successfully test our capitalization method in three micro datasets where we can observe both income and wealth: the Survey of Consumer Finance, linked estate and income tax returns, and foundations' tax records. We find that wealth concentration was high in the beginning of the twentieth century, fell from 1929 to 1978, and has continuously increased since then. The top 0.1% wealth share has risen from 7% in 1978 to 22% in 2012, a level almost as high as in 1929. Top wealth-holders are younger today than in the 1960s and earn a higher fraction of the economy's labor income. The bottom 90% wealth share first increased up to the mid-1980s and then steadily declined. The increase in wealth inequality in recent decades is due to the upsurge of top incomes combined with an increase in saving rate inequality. We explain how our findings can be reconciled with Survey of Consumer Finances and estate tax data.

@book{Atkinson2015,
  title = {Inequality: What Can Be Done?},
  author = {Atkinson, A. B.},
  year = {2015},
  url = {https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674504769},
  abstract = {Inequality is one of our most urgent social problems. Curbed in the decades after World War II, it has recently returned with a vengeance. We all know the scale of the problem---talk about the 99\% and the 1\% is entrenched in public debate---but there has been little discussion of what we can do but despair. According to the distinguished economist Anthony Atkinson, however, we can do much more than skeptics imagine. Atkinson has long been at the forefront of research on inequality, and brings his theoretical and practical experience to bear on its diverse problems. He presents a comprehensive set of policies that could bring about a genuine shift in the distribution of income in developed countries. The problem, Atkinson shows, is not simply that the rich are getting richer. We are also failing to tackle poverty, and the economy is rapidly changing to leave the majority of people behind. To reduce inequality, we have to go beyond placing new taxes on the wealthy to fund existing programs. We need fresh ideas. Atkinson thus recommends ambitious new policies in five areas: technology, employment, social security, the sharing of capital, and taxation. He defends these against the common arguments and excuses for inaction: that intervention will shrink the economy, that globalization makes action impossible, and that new policies cannot be afforded. More than just a program for change, Atkinson's book is a voice of hope and informed optimism about the possibilities for political action.},
  isbn = {978-0-674-50476-9},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Estate Inheritance and Gift Taxes,Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

Inequality is one of our most urgent social problems. Curbed in the decades after World War II, it has recently returned with a vengeance. We all know the scale of the problem—talk about the 99% and the 1% is entrenched in public debate—but there has been little discussion of what we can do but despair. According to the distinguished economist Anthony Atkinson, however, we can do much more than skeptics imagine. Atkinson has long been at the forefront of research on inequality, and brings his theoretical and practical experience to bear on its diverse problems. He presents a comprehensive set of policies that could bring about a genuine shift in the distribution of income in developed countries. The problem, Atkinson shows, is not simply that the rich are getting richer. We are also failing to tackle poverty, and the economy is rapidly changing to leave the majority of people behind. To reduce inequality, we have to go beyond placing new taxes on the wealthy to fund existing programs. We need fresh ideas. Atkinson thus recommends ambitious new policies in five areas: technology, employment, social security, the sharing of capital, and taxation. He defends these against the common arguments and excuses for inaction: that intervention will shrink the economy, that globalization makes action impossible, and that new policies cannot be afforded. More than just a program for change, Atkinson's book is a voice of hope and informed optimism about the possibilities for political action.

@article{Kamin2015,
  title = {How to Tax the Rich},
  author = {Kamin, David},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Tax Notes},
  volume = {146},
  number = {1},
  pages = {119--129},
  url = {https://ssrn.com/abstract=2550936},
  abstract = {This article reviews the menu of major options for increasing tax liabilities for the richest Americans. It concludes that a number of options that have received considerable attention and support are not viable as a practical matter --- looking at actual amounts of revenue raised and taking into account administrative considerations. This includes such options as taxing capital gains as ordinary income, which according to the official budget offices would raise little revenue due to the effect on realization behavior, and annual wealth taxes or broad mark-to-market accounting, which would be extraordinarily challenging to administer. The article then goes on to identify more viable options, the most promising of which may be taxing --- at least partially --- unrealized gains at death or gift, but also include a number of other policies like substantially expanding transfer taxes or increasing the tax rate on ordinary income.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

This article reviews the menu of major options for increasing tax liabilities for the richest Americans. It concludes that a number of options that have received considerable attention and support are not viable as a practical matter — looking at actual amounts of revenue raised and taking into account administrative considerations. This includes such options as taxing capital gains as ordinary income, which according to the official budget offices would raise little revenue due to the effect on realization behavior, and annual wealth taxes or broad mark-to-market accounting, which would be extraordinarily challenging to administer. The article then goes on to identify more viable options, the most promising of which may be taxing — at least partially — unrealized gains at death or gift, but also include a number of other policies like substantially expanding transfer taxes or increasing the tax rate on ordinary income.

@unpublished{Larudee2015,
  title = {Did Capital Go Away? {{Capital}} Flight as an Explanation for Declining Reported Wealth Inequality during and after {{World War I}}},
  author = {Larudee, Mehrene},
  year = {2015},
  url = {https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/Larudee_Did-K-Go-Away-for-YSI-Pisa.pdf},
  urldate = {2024-05-29},
  abstract = {Wealth inequality reportedly dropped sharply during and/or after World War I for France, Germany, and some other European countries (Piketty 2014). This paper explores what part of this drop was likely due to capital flight rather than solely physical destruction or solely loss in asset values. Piketty and Zucman (2014, Data Appendix) acknowledge that capital flight was one causal factor, at least flight of foreign assets from Germany in 1918-19 or so. For capital flight to Switzerland from France from 1912 to 1929, it is estimated, based on plausible assumptions, that the top 1 percent of wealth-holders transferred as much as 8 percent of their wealth to Switzerland, up to three-fourths of it as securities and one-fourth as financial deposits. This was over 5 percent of all private wealth in France. It was also over one-fifth of the financial deposits owned by the 1 percent, and it was the large majority of their foreign securities (apart from worthless Russian bonds, which the Soviets repudiated in 1918). Such capital flight alone would account for about one-fifth of the 11.3 percentage point decline in the top 1\%'s share of wealth in France from 1912 to 1929. But if the wealthy borrowed back their own flight capital in the guise of arm's-length loans, the total could account for two-fifths of the decline in the 1\%'s share of wealth by both removing the assets from reported wealth and transforming them into liabilities. Losses on Russian bonds evidently accounted for up to one-fifth of the decline. This establishes the plausibility of the hypothesis that by 1929, true wealth inequality in France and Germany, at least, had declined much less than reported inequality.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

Wealth inequality reportedly dropped sharply during and/or after World War I for France, Germany, and some other European countries (Piketty 2014). This paper explores what part of this drop was likely due to capital flight rather than solely physical destruction or solely loss in asset values. Piketty and Zucman (2014, Data Appendix) acknowledge that capital flight was one causal factor, at least flight of foreign assets from Germany in 1918-19 or so. For capital flight to Switzerland from France from 1912 to 1929, it is estimated, based on plausible assumptions, that the top 1 percent of wealth-holders transferred as much as 8 percent of their wealth to Switzerland, up to three-fourths of it as securities and one-fourth as financial deposits. This was over 5 percent of all private wealth in France. It was also over one-fifth of the financial deposits owned by the 1 percent, and it was the large majority of their foreign securities (apart from worthless Russian bonds, which the Soviets repudiated in 1918). Such capital flight alone would account for about one-fifth of the 11.3 percentage point decline in the top 1%'s share of wealth in France from 1912 to 1929. But if the wealthy borrowed back their own flight capital in the guise of arm's-length loans, the total could account for two-fifths of the decline in the 1%'s share of wealth by both removing the assets from reported wealth and transforming them into liabilities. Losses on Russian bonds evidently accounted for up to one-fifth of the decline. This establishes the plausibility of the hypothesis that by 1929, true wealth inequality in France and Germany, at least, had declined much less than reported inequality.

@book{Astarita2015,
  title = {Taxing Wealth: Past, Present, Future},
  editor = {Astarita, Caterina},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {European Economy Discussion Papers},
  series = {European {{Economy Discussion Papers}}},
  publisher = {{European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs}},
  doi = {10.2765/257050},
  url = {https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/economy-finance/taxing-wealth-past-present-future-workshop-proceedings_en},
  abstract = {In times of fiscal consolidation and strong macroeconomic adjustment needs in some EU Member States, the debate on wealth taxation gained momentum, both in the academic and in the policy debate. In this context, the aim of the workshop, held by DG ECFIN on 13 November 2014, was to discuss theoretical and policy issues associated with wealth taxation, including the broad principles and the concrete design challenges of an optimal wealth tax. Different types of wealth taxation have been scrutinised including transmission taxes, housing taxes and the taxation of financial assets. The challenges they may raise have been discussed also with respect to recent experience in particular Member States. The workshop was organised in two sessions: "Taxation of wealth: state of play and rationale" and "Taxing wealth: specific instruments and challenges". The proceedings offer a detailed summary of the most recent research related to various aspects of wealth taxation and carried out by academics and international organisations' representatives.},
  isbn = {978-92-79-48662-3},
  keywords = {Estate Inheritance and Gift Taxes,Wealth Taxation}
}

In times of fiscal consolidation and strong macroeconomic adjustment needs in some EU Member States, the debate on wealth taxation gained momentum, both in the academic and in the policy debate. In this context, the aim of the workshop, held by DG ECFIN on 13 November 2014, was to discuss theoretical and policy issues associated with wealth taxation, including the broad principles and the concrete design challenges of an optimal wealth tax. Different types of wealth taxation have been scrutinised including transmission taxes, housing taxes and the taxation of financial assets. The challenges they may raise have been discussed also with respect to recent experience in particular Member States. The workshop was organised in two sessions: "Taxation of wealth: state of play and rationale" and "Taxing wealth: specific instruments and challenges". The proceedings offer a detailed summary of the most recent research related to various aspects of wealth taxation and carried out by academics and international organisations' representatives.

@article{Chettyetal2014,
  title = {Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-out in Retirement Savings Accounts: Evidence from {{Denmark}}},
  author = {Chetty, Raj and Friedman, John N. and {Leth-Petersen}, S{\o}ren and Nielsen, Torben Heien and Olsen, Tore},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {129},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1141--1219},
  doi = {10.1093/qje/qju013},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qju013},
  abstract = {Using 41 million observations on savings for the population of Denmark, we show that the effects of retirement savings policies on wealth accumulation depend on whether they change savings rates by active or passive choice. Subsidies for retirement accounts, which rely on individuals to take an action to raise savings, primarily induce individuals to shift assets from taxable accounts to retirement accounts. We estimate that each \$1 of government expenditure on subsidies increases total saving by only 1 cent. In contrast, policies that raise retirement contributions if individuals take no action---such as automatic employer contributions to retirement accounts---increase wealth accumulation substantially. We estimate that approximately 15\% of individuals are ``active savers'' who respond to tax subsidies primarily by shifting assets across accounts; 85\% of individuals are ``passive savers'' who are unresponsive to subsidies but are instead heavily influenced by automatic contributions made on their behalf. Active savers tend to be wealthier and more financially sophisticated. We conclude that automatic contributions are more effective at increasing savings rates than subsidies for three reasons: (i) subsidies induce relatively few individuals to respond, (ii) they generate substantial crowd-out conditional on response, and (iii) they do not increase the savings of passive individuals, who are least prepared for retirement.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

Using 41 million observations on savings for the population of Denmark, we show that the effects of retirement savings policies on wealth accumulation depend on whether they change savings rates by active or passive choice. Subsidies for retirement accounts, which rely on individuals to take an action to raise savings, primarily induce individuals to shift assets from taxable accounts to retirement accounts. We estimate that each $1 of government expenditure on subsidies increases total saving by only 1 cent. In contrast, policies that raise retirement contributions if individuals take no action—such as automatic employer contributions to retirement accounts—increase wealth accumulation substantially. We estimate that approximately 15% of individuals are ``active savers'' who respond to tax subsidies primarily by shifting assets across accounts; 85% of individuals are ``passive savers'' who are unresponsive to subsidies but are instead heavily influenced by automatic contributions made on their behalf. Active savers tend to be wealthier and more financially sophisticated. We conclude that automatic contributions are more effective at increasing savings rates than subsidies for three reasons: (i) subsidies induce relatively few individuals to respond, (ii) they generate substantial crowd-out conditional on response, and (iii) they do not increase the savings of passive individuals, who are least prepared for retirement.

@article{JohannesenZucman2014,
  title = {The End of Bank Secrecy? {{An}} Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown},
  author = {Johannesen, Niels and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
  volume = {6},
  number = {1},
  pages = {65--91},
  doi = {10.1257/pol.6.1.65},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.6.1.65},
  abstract = {During the financial crisis, G20 countries compelled tax havens to sign bilateral treaties providing for exchange of bank information. Policymakers have celebrated this global initiative as the end of bank secrecy. Exploiting a unique panel dataset, our study is the first attempt to assess how the treaties affected bank deposits in tax havens. Rather than repatriating funds, our results suggest that tax evaders shifted deposits to havens not covered by a treaty with their home country. The crackdown thus caused a relocation of deposits at the benefit of the least compliant havens. We discuss the policy implications of these findings.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

During the financial crisis, G20 countries compelled tax havens to sign bilateral treaties providing for exchange of bank information. Policymakers have celebrated this global initiative as the end of bank secrecy. Exploiting a unique panel dataset, our study is the first attempt to assess how the treaties affected bank deposits in tax havens. Rather than repatriating funds, our results suggest that tax evaders shifted deposits to havens not covered by a treaty with their home country. The crackdown thus caused a relocation of deposits at the benefit of the least compliant havens. We discuss the policy implications of these findings.

@book{Piketty2014,
  title = {Capital in the Twenty-First Century},
  author = {Piketty, Thomas},
  translator = {Goldhammer, Arthur},
  year = {2014},
  publisher = {The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press},
  address = {Cambridge, MA},
  url = {http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c2},
  urldate = {2022-02-25},
  isbn = {978-0-674-24507-5},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

@article{PikettyZucman2014,
  title = {Capital Is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1700--2010},
  author = {Piketty, Thomas and Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {129},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1255--1310},
  doi = {10.1093/qje/qju018},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qju018},
  abstract = {How do aggregate wealth-to-income ratios evolve in the long run and why? We address this question using 1970--2010 national balance sheets recently compiled in the top eight developed economies. For the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and France, we are able to extend our analysis as far back as 1700. We find in every country a gradual rise` of wealth-income ratios in recent decades, from about 200--300\% in 1970 to 400--600\% in 2010. In effect, today's ratios appear to be returning to the high values observed in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (600--700\%). This can be explained by a long-run asset price recovery (itself driven by changes in capital policies since the world wars) and by the slowdown of productivity and population growth, in line with the {$\beta$}=s/g Harrod-Domar-Solow formula. That is, for a given net saving rate s = 10\%, the long-run wealth-income ratio is about 300\% if g = 3\% and 600\% if g = 1.5\%. Our results have implications for capital taxation and regulation and shed new light on the changing nature of wealth, the shape of the production function, and the rise of capital shares.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

How do aggregate wealth-to-income ratios evolve in the long run and why? We address this question using 1970–2010 national balance sheets recently compiled in the top eight developed economies. For the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and France, we are able to extend our analysis as far back as 1700. We find in every country a gradual rise` of wealth-income ratios in recent decades, from about 200–300% in 1970 to 400–600% in 2010. In effect, today's ratios appear to be returning to the high values observed in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (600–700%). This can be explained by a long-run asset price recovery (itself driven by changes in capital policies since the world wars) and by the slowdown of productivity and population growth, in line with the $β$=s/g Harrod-Domar-Solow formula. That is, for a given net saving rate s = 10%, the long-run wealth-income ratio is about 300% if g = 3% and 600% if g = 1.5%. Our results have implications for capital taxation and regulation and shed new light on the changing nature of wealth, the shape of the production function, and the rise of capital shares.

@article{Sloan2014,
  title = {Positively Un-{{American}} Tax Dodges},
  author = {Sloan, Allan},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Fortune},
  pages = {62--70},
  url = {http://fortune.com/2014/07/07/taxes-offshore-dodge/},
  abstract = {Multinational firms are moving headquarters to avoid US tax rates. The US corporate tax rate is 35 percent compared to Ireland's 12.5 percent. About 60 firms have abandoned the United States because it taxes all profits worldwide, notes Alan Sloan for Fortune magazine, and he contends the transfers undermine the US tax base, standards and respect for corporate brands: "Inverters don't hesitate to take advantage of the great things that make America America: our deep financial markets, our democracy and rule of law, our military might, our intellectual and physical infrastructure, our national research programs, all the terrific places our country offers for employees and their families to live. But inverters do hesitate - totally - when it's time to ante up their fair share of financial support of our system." Tax reform, or lack thereof, could be chasing the companies away. Sloan urges companies to report publicly income and taxes paid so that government can make accurate comparisons.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

Multinational firms are moving headquarters to avoid US tax rates. The US corporate tax rate is 35 percent compared to Ireland's 12.5 percent. About 60 firms have abandoned the United States because it taxes all profits worldwide, notes Alan Sloan for Fortune magazine, and he contends the transfers undermine the US tax base, standards and respect for corporate brands: "Inverters don't hesitate to take advantage of the great things that make America America: our deep financial markets, our democracy and rule of law, our military might, our intellectual and physical infrastructure, our national research programs, all the terrific places our country offers for employees and their families to live. But inverters do hesitate - totally - when it's time to ante up their fair share of financial support of our system." Tax reform, or lack thereof, could be chasing the companies away. Sloan urges companies to report publicly income and taxes paid so that government can make accurate comparisons.

@techreport{Zoutman2014,
  type = {Discussion {{Paper}}},
  title = {The Effect of Capital Taxes on Household's Portfolio Composition and Intertemporal Choice: Evidence from the {{Dutch}} 2001 Capital Income Tax Reform},
  author = {Zoutman, Floris T.},
  year = {2014},
  month = jun,
  number = {2014/23},
  institution = {{NHH Department of Business and Management Science}},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2451061},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2451061},
  abstract = {This paper estimates the effect of capital taxation on portfolio composition and savings using quasi-experimental variation generated by the Dutch 2001 capital tax reform. The reform drove a wedge between the taxation of housing and financial wealth and in addition affected the after-tax return on all assets. I use unique administrative household panel data with information on capital income, wealth and portfolio shares to exploit this variation. I derive and estimate a semi-structural model which directly relates the share invested in financial wealth to the after-tax return on financial and housing wealth. In addition, I link accumulated wealth in the reform-period to the change in the after-tax return on total wealth. Elasticities have the expected sign but are modest in size. I find some evidence for heterogeneity in the behavioral response. In particular, rich and single households seem to be more responsive in terms of both portfolio composition and wealth accumulation, than other households. The estimated elasticities can be used in capital tax models to calibrate the optimal tax rate.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper estimates the effect of capital taxation on portfolio composition and savings using quasi-experimental variation generated by the Dutch 2001 capital tax reform. The reform drove a wedge between the taxation of housing and financial wealth and in addition affected the after-tax return on all assets. I use unique administrative household panel data with information on capital income, wealth and portfolio shares to exploit this variation. I derive and estimate a semi-structural model which directly relates the share invested in financial wealth to the after-tax return on financial and housing wealth. In addition, I link accumulated wealth in the reform-period to the change in the after-tax return on total wealth. Elasticities have the expected sign but are modest in size. I find some evidence for heterogeneity in the behavioral response. In particular, rich and single households seem to be more responsive in terms of both portfolio composition and wealth accumulation, than other households. The estimated elasticities can be used in capital tax models to calibrate the optimal tax rate.

@article{Zucman2014,
  title = {Taxing across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate Profits},
  author = {Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  volume = {28},
  number = {4},
  pages = {121--148},
  publisher = {American Economic Association},
  doi = {10.1257/jep.28.4.121},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.28.4.121},
  abstract = {This article attempts to estimate the magnitude of corporate tax avoidance and personal tax evasion through offshore tax havens. US corporations book 20 percent of their profits in tax havens, a tenfold increase since the 1980; their effective tax rate has declined from 30 to 20 percent over the last 15 years, and about two-thirds of this decline can be attributed to increased international tax avoidance. Globally, 8 percent of the world?s personal financial wealth is held offshore, costing more than \$200 billion to governments every year. Despite ambitious policy initiatives, profit shifting to tax havens and offshore wealth are rising. I discuss the recent proposals made to address these issues, and I argue that the main objective should be to create a world financial registry.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This article attempts to estimate the magnitude of corporate tax avoidance and personal tax evasion through offshore tax havens. US corporations book 20 percent of their profits in tax havens, a tenfold increase since the 1980; their effective tax rate has declined from 30 to 20 percent over the last 15 years, and about two-thirds of this decline can be attributed to increased international tax avoidance. Globally, 8 percent of the world?s personal financial wealth is held offshore, costing more than $200 billion to governments every year. Despite ambitious policy initiatives, profit shifting to tax havens and offshore wealth are rising. I discuss the recent proposals made to address these issues, and I argue that the main objective should be to create a world financial registry.

@article{Kopczuk2013,
  title = {Incentive Effects of Inheritances and Optimal Estate Taxation},
  author = {Kopczuk, Wojciech},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {American Economic Review: Papers \& Proceedings},
  volume = {103},
  number = {3},
  pages = {472--477},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.103.3.472},
  url = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.103.3.472},
  abstract = {Estate taxation is a policy topic of continued interest. Despite rumors of its demise in the United States where it was put on life support as the result of partial repeal in 2010, its future now seems more alive. However, the economic literature on taxation of estates is surprisingly inconclusive (see Kopczuk forthcoming for a recent survey). When generations are linked by altru-ism and the objective function respects dynas-tic preferences, taxation of estates is analogous to taxation of saving with the identical baseline result of no taxation. In a recent paper, Farhi and Werning (2010) allow for the social planner to value welfare of the children's generation separately from the dynastic welfare and show that the corresponding externality due to insufficient giving should be addressed by policy that subsidizes bequests (albeit in a "progressive" manner). In a very stylized model, Kopczuk (2001) focuses on steady state policies in the presence of non-altruistic bequest motives and shows that the estate tax is a useful instrument. Piketty and Saez (2012) analyze linear taxation and many different extensions of a steady state setup and generally find a role for taxation of bequests. The objective of this note is to clarify economic assumptions that determine the optimal tax treatment of bequests. I consider a joy-of-giving bequest motive and two generations: parents and children. The model captures two EstatE and Gift taxation {\ddag} key considerations. First, within any particular family, bequests have a positive externality because they benefit both parents and children. One can view this aspect as a manifestation of the source of the common argument against taxing estates: they reflect generosity not just self-interest. At the same time, bequests generate inequality in the children's generation. While inequality induced by bequests has its ultimate source in the initial conditions (skill distribution of parents), the key point is that tax on bequests plays an independent redis-tributive role within the offspring generation. This is made stark by the joy-of-giving model that eliminates interactions between the two generations. In contrast, the standard altruistic model would assume that parents internalize incentives of children so that there would be no distinction between redistribution among dynasties, parents, and children. I show that the optimal bequest tax formula is simple and intuitive and it reflects these two forces: correction of an externality that pushes toward subsidies and relaxing of children's incentive constraints due to an income effect that pushes toward taxation. The relative strength of these two effects determines the optimal sign and magnitude of the tax. I speculate that the optimal tax structure may in fact involve subsidies at the bottom and taxation at the top of the distribution. I further suggest that inheritance rather than estate tax may be a more suitable instrument here, because all determinants of the optimal policy reflect characteristics of a child. The results also highlight the key empirical parameters of interest. It is the magnitude of the income effect due to bequests that influences the optimal tax rate. In contrast, under the simple structure assumed in this paper, the direct effect of taxation on bequests does not enter the optimal tax formula.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

Estate taxation is a policy topic of continued interest. Despite rumors of its demise in the United States where it was put on life support as the result of partial repeal in 2010, its future now seems more alive. However, the economic literature on taxation of estates is surprisingly inconclusive (see Kopczuk forthcoming for a recent survey). When generations are linked by altru-ism and the objective function respects dynas-tic preferences, taxation of estates is analogous to taxation of saving with the identical baseline result of no taxation. In a recent paper, Farhi and Werning (2010) allow for the social planner to value welfare of the children's generation separately from the dynastic welfare and show that the corresponding externality due to insufficient giving should be addressed by policy that subsidizes bequests (albeit in a "progressive" manner). In a very stylized model, Kopczuk (2001) focuses on steady state policies in the presence of non-altruistic bequest motives and shows that the estate tax is a useful instrument. Piketty and Saez (2012) analyze linear taxation and many different extensions of a steady state setup and generally find a role for taxation of bequests. The objective of this note is to clarify economic assumptions that determine the optimal tax treatment of bequests. I consider a joy-of-giving bequest motive and two generations: parents and children. The model captures two EstatE and Gift taxation ‡ key considerations. First, within any particular family, bequests have a positive externality because they benefit both parents and children. One can view this aspect as a manifestation of the source of the common argument against taxing estates: they reflect generosity not just self-interest. At the same time, bequests generate inequality in the children's generation. While inequality induced by bequests has its ultimate source in the initial conditions (skill distribution of parents), the key point is that tax on bequests plays an independent redis-tributive role within the offspring generation. This is made stark by the joy-of-giving model that eliminates interactions between the two generations. In contrast, the standard altruistic model would assume that parents internalize incentives of children so that there would be no distinction between redistribution among dynasties, parents, and children. I show that the optimal bequest tax formula is simple and intuitive and it reflects these two forces: correction of an externality that pushes toward subsidies and relaxing of children's incentive constraints due to an income effect that pushes toward taxation. The relative strength of these two effects determines the optimal sign and magnitude of the tax. I speculate that the optimal tax structure may in fact involve subsidies at the bottom and taxation at the top of the distribution. I further suggest that inheritance rather than estate tax may be a more suitable instrument here, because all determinants of the optimal policy reflect characteristics of a child. The results also highlight the key empirical parameters of interest. It is the magnitude of the income effect due to bequests that influences the optimal tax rate. In contrast, under the simple structure assumed in this paper, the direct effect of taxation on bequests does not enter the optimal tax formula.

@book{Palanetal2013,
  title = {Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works},
  author = {Palan, Ronen and Murphy, Richard and Chavagneux, Christian},
  year = {2013},
  publisher = {Cornell University Press},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00062_3.x},
  url = {https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801476129/tax-havens/},
  abstract = {From the Cayman Islands and the Isle of Man to the Principality of Liechtenstein and the state of Delaware, tax havens offer lower tax rates, less stringent regulations and enforcement, and promises of strict secrecy to individuals and corporations alike. In recent years government regulators, hoping to remedy economic crisis by diverting capital from hidden channels back into taxable view, have undertaken sustained and serious efforts to force tax havens into compliance. In Tax Havens, Ronen Palan, Richard Murphy, and Christian Chavagneux provide an up-to-date evaluation of the role and function of tax havens in the global financial system-their history, inner workings, impact, extent, and enforcement. They make clear that while, individually, tax havens may appear insignificant, together they have a major impact on the global economy. Holding up to \$13 trillion of personal wealth-the equivalent of the annual U.S. Gross National Product-and serving as the legal home of two million corporate entities and half of all international lending banks, tax havens also skew the distribution of globalization's costs and benefits to the detriment of developing economies. The first comprehensive account of these entities, this book challenges much of the conventional wisdom about tax havens. The authors reveal that, rather than operating at the margins of the world economy, tax havens are integral to it. More than simple conduits for tax avoidance and evasion, tax havens actually belong to the broad world of finance, to the business of managing the monetary resources of individuals, organizations, and countries. They have become among the most powerful instruments of globalization, one of the principal causes of global financial instability, and one of the large political issues of our times.},
  isbn = {978-0-8014-6856-8},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Wealth Taxation}
}

From the Cayman Islands and the Isle of Man to the Principality of Liechtenstein and the state of Delaware, tax havens offer lower tax rates, less stringent regulations and enforcement, and promises of strict secrecy to individuals and corporations alike. In recent years government regulators, hoping to remedy economic crisis by diverting capital from hidden channels back into taxable view, have undertaken sustained and serious efforts to force tax havens into compliance. In Tax Havens, Ronen Palan, Richard Murphy, and Christian Chavagneux provide an up-to-date evaluation of the role and function of tax havens in the global financial system-their history, inner workings, impact, extent, and enforcement. They make clear that while, individually, tax havens may appear insignificant, together they have a major impact on the global economy. Holding up to $13 trillion of personal wealth-the equivalent of the annual U.S. Gross National Product-and serving as the legal home of two million corporate entities and half of all international lending banks, tax havens also skew the distribution of globalization's costs and benefits to the detriment of developing economies. The first comprehensive account of these entities, this book challenges much of the conventional wisdom about tax havens. The authors reveal that, rather than operating at the margins of the world economy, tax havens are integral to it. More than simple conduits for tax avoidance and evasion, tax havens actually belong to the broad world of finance, to the business of managing the monetary resources of individuals, organizations, and countries. They have become among the most powerful instruments of globalization, one of the principal causes of global financial instability, and one of the large political issues of our times.

@article{PikettySaez2013,
  title = {A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation},
  author = {Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {81},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1851--1886},
  doi = {10.3982/ECTA10712},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10712},
  abstract = {This paper derives optimal inheritance tax formulas that capture the key equity efficiency trade-off, are expressed in terms of estimable sufficient statistics, and are ro bust to the underlying structure of preferences. We consider dynamic stochastic models with general and heterogeneous bequest tastes and labor productivities. We limit our selves to simple but realistic linear or two-bracket tax structures to obtain tractable formulas. We show that long-run optimal inheritance tax rates can always be expressed in terms of aggregate earnings and bequest elasticities with respect to tax rates, dis tributional parameters, and social preferences for redistribution. Those results carry over with tractable modifications to (a) the case with social discounting (instead of steady-state welfare maximization), (b) the case with partly accidental bequests, (c) the standard Barro-Becker dynastic model. The optimal tax rate is positive and quantita tively large if the elasticity of bequests to the tax rate is low, bequest concentration is high, and society cares mostly about those receiving little inheritance. We propose a calibration using micro-data for France and the United States. We find that, for real istic parameters, the optimal inheritance tax rate might be as large as 50\%-60\%---or even higher for top bequests, in line with historical experience.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper derives optimal inheritance tax formulas that capture the key equity efficiency trade-off, are expressed in terms of estimable sufficient statistics, and are ro bust to the underlying structure of preferences. We consider dynamic stochastic models with general and heterogeneous bequest tastes and labor productivities. We limit our selves to simple but realistic linear or two-bracket tax structures to obtain tractable formulas. We show that long-run optimal inheritance tax rates can always be expressed in terms of aggregate earnings and bequest elasticities with respect to tax rates, dis tributional parameters, and social preferences for redistribution. Those results carry over with tractable modifications to (a) the case with social discounting (instead of steady-state welfare maximization), (b) the case with partly accidental bequests, (c) the standard Barro-Becker dynastic model. The optimal tax rate is positive and quantita tively large if the elasticity of bequests to the tax rate is low, bequest concentration is high, and society cares mostly about those receiving little inheritance. We propose a calibration using micro-data for France and the United States. We find that, for real istic parameters, the optimal inheritance tax rate might be as large as 50%-60%—or even higher for top bequests, in line with historical experience.

@article{Zucman2013,
  title = {The Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Europe and the {{U}}.{{S}}. Net Debtors or Net Creditors?},
  author = {Zucman, Gabriel},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {128},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1321--1364},
  doi = {10.1093/qje/qjt012},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt012},
  abstract = {This article shows that official statistics substantially underestimate the net foreign asset positions of rich countries because they fail to capture most of the assets held by households in offshore tax havens. Drawing on a unique Swiss data set and exploiting systematic anomalies in countries' portfolio investment positions, I find that around 8\% of the global financial wealth of households is held in tax havens, three-quarters of which goes unrecorded. On the basis of plausible assumptions, accounting for unrecorded assets turns the eurozone, officially the world's second largest net debtor, into a net creditor. It also reduces the U.S. net debt significantly. The results shed new light on global imbalances and challenge the widespread view that after a decade of poor-to-rich capital flows, external assets are now in poor countries and debts in rich countries. I provide concrete proposals to improve international statistics.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This article shows that official statistics substantially underestimate the net foreign asset positions of rich countries because they fail to capture most of the assets held by households in offshore tax havens. Drawing on a unique Swiss data set and exploiting systematic anomalies in countries' portfolio investment positions, I find that around 8% of the global financial wealth of households is held in tax havens, three-quarters of which goes unrecorded. On the basis of plausible assumptions, accounting for unrecorded assets turns the eurozone, officially the world's second largest net debtor, into a net creditor. It also reduces the U.S. net debt significantly. The results shed new light on global imbalances and challenge the widespread view that after a decade of poor-to-rich capital flows, external assets are now in poor countries and debts in rich countries. I provide concrete proposals to improve international statistics.

@article{Farhietal2012,
  title = {Non-Linear Capital Taxation without Commitment},
  author = {Farhi, Emmanuel and Sleet, Christopher and Werning, Iv{\'a}n and Yeltekin, Sevin},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
  volume = {79},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1469--1493},
  doi = {10.1093/restud/rds001},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rds001},
  abstract = {We study efficient non-linear taxation of labour and capital in a dynamic Mirrleesian model incorporating political economy constraints. Policies are chosen sequentially over time, without commitment. Our main result is that the marginal tax on capital income is progressive, in the sense that richer agents face higher marginal tax rates.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

We study efficient non-linear taxation of labour and capital in a dynamic Mirrleesian model incorporating political economy constraints. Policies are chosen sequentially over time, without commitment. Our main result is that the marginal tax on capital income is progressive, in the sense that richer agents face higher marginal tax rates.

@misc{Henry2012,
  title = {The Price of Offshore Revisited: New Estimates for "Missing" Global Private Wealth, Income, Inequality, and Lost Taxes},
  author = {Henry, James S.},
  year = {2012},
  month = jul,
  url = {https://www.taxjustice.net/2014/01/17/price-offshore-revisited/},
  urldate = {2023-07-31},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Tax Justice Network}
}

@article{Benhabibetal2011,
  title = {The Distribution of Wealth and Fiscal Policy in Economies with Finitely Lived Agents},
  author = {Benhabib, Jess and Bisin, Alberto and Zhu, Shenghao},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {79},
  number = {1},
  pages = {123--157},
  doi = {10.3982/ECTA8416},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA8416},
  abstract = {We study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in an overlapping generation economy with finitely lived agents and intergenerational transmission of wealth. Financial markets are incomplete, exposing agents to both labor and capital income risk. We show that the stationary wealth distribution is a Pareto distribution in the right tail and that it is capital income risk, rather than labor income, that drives the properties of the right tail of the wealth distribution. We also study analytically the dependence of the distribution of wealth---of wealth inequality in particular---on various fiscal policy instruments like capital income taxes and estate taxes, and on different degrees of social mobility. We show that capital income and estate taxes can significantly reduce wealth inequality, as do institutions favoring social mobility. Finally, we calibrate the economy to match the Lorenz curve of the wealth distribution of the U.S. economy.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Estate Inheritance and Gift Taxes,Intergenerational Wealth,Wealth Taxation}
}

We study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in an overlapping generation economy with finitely lived agents and intergenerational transmission of wealth. Financial markets are incomplete, exposing agents to both labor and capital income risk. We show that the stationary wealth distribution is a Pareto distribution in the right tail and that it is capital income risk, rather than labor income, that drives the properties of the right tail of the wealth distribution. We also study analytically the dependence of the distribution of wealth—of wealth inequality in particular—on various fiscal policy instruments like capital income taxes and estate taxes, and on different degrees of social mobility. We show that capital income and estate taxes can significantly reduce wealth inequality, as do institutions favoring social mobility. Finally, we calibrate the economy to match the Lorenz curve of the wealth distribution of the U.S. economy.

@incollection{AlvaredoSaez2010,
  title = {Income and Wealth Concentration in {{Spain}} in a Historical and Fiscal Perspective},
  booktitle = {Top Incomes: A Global Perspective},
  author = {Alvaredo, Facundo and Saez, Emmanuel},
  editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.},
  year = {2010},
  month = may,
  pages = {482--559},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  address = {New York},
  url = {https://global.oup.com/academic/product/top-incomes-9780199286898?cc=us&lang=en&#},
  isbn = {978-0-19-928689-8},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  chapter = {10},
  url_article_version = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/alvaredo-saez-incomeandwealthconcentrationinspainfromahistoricalandfiscalperspective-2009},
  url_data_file = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/alvaredo-saez-incomeandwealthconcentrationinspaininahistoricalandfiscalperspectivedatafile-2010}
}

@incollection{Boadwayetal2010a,
  title = {Taxation of Wealth and Wealth Transfers},
  booktitle = {Dimensions of Tax Design: The {{Mirrlees Review}}},
  author = {Boadway, Robin and Chamberlain, Emma and Emmerson, Carl},
  editor = {Mirrlees, James and Adam, Stuart and Besley, Timothy and Blundell, Richard and Bond, Stephen and Chote, Robert and Gammie, Malcolm and Johnson, Paul and Myles, Gareth and Poterba, James},
  year = {2010},
  pages = {737--836},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  url = {https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/5225},
  abstract = {Dimensions of Tax Design brings together a high-profile group of more than fifty international experts and younger researchers. It consists of a set of thirteen commissioned studies which draw on the latest thinking in each area. These are supplemented by expert commentaries to provide a wide range of views and ideas.},
  isbn = {978-0-19-955375-4},
  keywords = {Estate Inheritance and Gift Taxes,Wealth Taxation}
}

Dimensions of Tax Design brings together a high-profile group of more than fifty international experts and younger researchers. It consists of a set of thirteen commissioned studies which draw on the latest thinking in each area. These are supplemented by expert commentaries to provide a wide range of views and ideas.

@techreport{Kopczuk2010,
  type = {Working {{Paper}}},
  title = {Economics of Estate Taxation: A Brief Review of Theory and Evidence},
  author = {Kopczuk, Wojciech},
  year = {2010},
  month = feb,
  number = {15741},
  institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research},
  doi = {10.3386/w15741},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3386/w15741},
  abstract = {This paper provides a non-technical overview of the economic arguments related to the desirability of transfer taxation and a summary of empirical evidence surrounding these issues. Understanding optimal transfer taxation throughout the distribution requires understanding the nature of a bequest motive, a topic on which there is little consensus. However, I argue that progress still can be made on the question of desirability and optimal level of estate taxation at the top of the distribution, because interpersonal externalities implied by the presence of bequest motive are irrelevant from the welfare point of view when the focus is on the wealthy. I also examine the role of negative externalities from wealth concentration in providing justification for considering this type of taxation.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper provides a non-technical overview of the economic arguments related to the desirability of transfer taxation and a summary of empirical evidence surrounding these issues. Understanding optimal transfer taxation throughout the distribution requires understanding the nature of a bequest motive, a topic on which there is little consensus. However, I argue that progress still can be made on the question of desirability and optimal level of estate taxation at the top of the distribution, because interpersonal externalities implied by the presence of bequest motive are irrelevant from the welfare point of view when the focus is on the wealthy. I also examine the role of negative externalities from wealth concentration in providing justification for considering this type of taxation.

@article{AlvaredoSaez2009,
  title = {Income and Wealth Concentration in {{Spain}} from a Historical and Fiscal Perspective},
  author = {Alvaredo, Facundo and Saez, Emmanuel},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
  volume = {7},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1140--1167},
  doi = {10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.5.1140},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.5.1140},
  abstract = {This paper presents series on top shares of income and wealth in Spain using personal income and wealth tax return statistics. Top income shares are highest in the 1930s, fall sharply during the first decade of the Franco dictatorship, then remain stable and low till the 1980s, and have increased since the mid 1990s. The top 0.01\% income share in Spain estimated from income tax data is comparable to estimates for the United States and France over the period 1933--1971. Those findings, along with a careful analysis of all published tax statistics, suggest that income tax evasion and avoidance among top income earners in Spain was much less prevalent than previously thought. Wealth concentration has been about stable from 1982 to 2005 as surging real estate prices have benefited the middle class and compensated for a slight increase in financial wealth concentration in the 1990s. We use our wealth series and a simple model to analyze the effects of the wealth tax exemption of stocks for owners-managers introduced in 1994. We show that the reform induced substantial shifting from the taxable to tax exempt status, hence creating efficiency costs.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  url_book_chapter = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/alvaredo-saez-incomeandwealthconcentrationinspaininahistoricalandfiscalperspective-2010},
  url_data_file = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/alvaredo-saez-incomeandwealthconcentrationinspaininahistoricalandfiscalperspectivedatafile-2010}
}

This paper presents series on top shares of income and wealth in Spain using personal income and wealth tax return statistics. Top income shares are highest in the 1930s, fall sharply during the first decade of the Franco dictatorship, then remain stable and low till the 1980s, and have increased since the mid 1990s. The top 0.01% income share in Spain estimated from income tax data is comparable to estimates for the United States and France over the period 1933–1971. Those findings, along with a careful analysis of all published tax statistics, suggest that income tax evasion and avoidance among top income earners in Spain was much less prevalent than previously thought. Wealth concentration has been about stable from 1982 to 2005 as surging real estate prices have benefited the middle class and compensated for a slight increase in financial wealth concentration in the 1990s. We use our wealth series and a simple model to analyze the effects of the wealth tax exemption of stocks for owners-managers introduced in 1994. We show that the reform induced substantial shifting from the taxable to tax exempt status, hence creating efficiency costs.

@misc{OwensSaint-Amans2009,
  title = {Countering Offshore Tax Evasion: Some Questions and Answers on the Project},
  author = {Owens, Jeffrey and {Saint-Amans}, Pascal},
  year = {2009},
  month = sep,
  url = {http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/publicationsdocuments/16/},
  urldate = {2023-07-31},
  abstract = {Frequently asked questions about the project on countering offshore tax evasion.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {OECD}
}

Frequently asked questions about the project on countering offshore tax evasion.

@incollection{Delletal2007,
  title = {Income and Wealth Concentration in {{Switzerland}} over the Twentieth Century},
  booktitle = {Top Incomes over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast between Continental {{European}} and {{English-speaking}} Countries},
  author = {Dell, F. and Piketty, T. and Saez, E.},
  editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.},
  year = {2007},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  address = {New York},
  url = {https://global.oup.com/academic/product/top-incomes-over-the-twentieth-century-9780198727750?lang=en&cc=us},
  urldate = {2022-03-24},
  isbn = {978-0-19-872775-0},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  url_data_series = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/dell-piketty-saez-incomeandwealthconcentrationinswitzerlandoverthe20thcenturydataseries-2005}
}

@article{FeldmanSlemrod2007,
  title = {Estimating Tax Noncompliance with Evidence from Unaudited Tax Returns},
  author = {Feldman, Naomi E. and Slemrod, Joel},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {117},
  number = {518},
  pages = {327--352},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02020.x},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02020.x},
  abstract = {This article estimates the degree of tax noncompliance using evidence from unaudited tax returns. Measurements of noncompliance are derived from the relationship between reported charitable contributions and reported income from wages and salary as compared to alternative reported income sources such as self-employment, farm and other small business income. Assuming that the source of one's income is unrelated to one's charitable inclinations and that the ratio of true income to taxable income does not vary by income source, any difference in the relationship between charitable contributions and the source of income can be attributed to (relative) underreporting by the individual. We find that the implied amount of noncompliance is significant and that it varies by source of income, as well as between positive and negative values of each type of income.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This article estimates the degree of tax noncompliance using evidence from unaudited tax returns. Measurements of noncompliance are derived from the relationship between reported charitable contributions and reported income from wages and salary as compared to alternative reported income sources such as self-employment, farm and other small business income. Assuming that the source of one's income is unrelated to one's charitable inclinations and that the ratio of true income to taxable income does not vary by income source, any difference in the relationship between charitable contributions and the source of income can be attributed to (relative) underreporting by the individual. We find that the implied amount of noncompliance is significant and that it varies by source of income, as well as between positive and negative values of each type of income.

@article{Jacobsonetal2007,
  title = {The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting},
  author = {Jacobson, Darien B. and Raub, Brian G. and Johnson, Barry W.},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Statistics of Income Bulletin},
  volume = {27},
  number = {1},
  pages = {118--128},
  url = {https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-soi-bulletin-summer-2007},
  keywords = {Data Sources: Estate Inheritance and Gift Taxes,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  url_file = {Jacobsonetal2007.pdf}
}

@article{Slemrod2007,
  title = {Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion},
  author = {Slemrod, Joel},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  volume = {21},
  number = {1},
  pages = {25--48},
  doi = {10.1257/jep.21.1.25},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.21.1.25},
  abstract = {No government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers' sense of duty to remit what is owed. Some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe, but many others will not. Over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink, as they see how they are being taken advantage of by the others. Thus, paying taxes must be made a legal responsibility of citizens, with penalties attendant on noncompliance. But even in the face of those penalties, substantial tax evasion exists. Tax evasion is widespread, always has been, and probably always will be. This essay reviews what is known about the magnitude, nature, and determinants of tax evasion, with an emphasis on the U.S. income tax. It then places this information into a conceptual context, examining various models and theories, and considers policy implications.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

No government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers' sense of duty to remit what is owed. Some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe, but many others will not. Over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink, as they see how they are being taken advantage of by the others. Thus, paying taxes must be made a legal responsibility of citizens, with penalties attendant on noncompliance. But even in the face of those penalties, substantial tax evasion exists. Tax evasion is widespread, always has been, and probably always will be. This essay reviews what is known about the magnitude, nature, and determinants of tax evasion, with an emphasis on the U.S. income tax. It then places this information into a conceptual context, examining various models and theories, and considers policy implications.

@misc{2007_OffshoreTaxEvasionStashingCash,
  title = {Offshore Tax Evasion: Stashing Cash Overseas: Hearing before the {{Committee}} on {{Finance}}, {{US}} Senate, 110th Congress},
  year = {2007},
  pages = {184},
  url = {https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/-offshore-tax-evasion-stashing-cash-overseas},
  abstract = {Senate Hearing 110--677},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

Senate Hearing 110–677

@article{Pikettyetal2006,
  title = {Wealth Concentration in a Developing Economy: {{Paris}} and {{France}}, 1807--1994},
  author = {Piketty, Thomas and {Postel-Vinay}, Gilles and Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent},
  year = {2006},
  month = mar,
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {96},
  number = {1},
  pages = {236--256},
  doi = {10.1257/000282806776157614},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/000282806776157614},
  abstract = {Using large samples of estate tax returns, we construct new series on wealth concentration in Paris and France from 1807 to 1994. Inequality increased until 1914 because industrial and financial estates grew dramatically. Then, adverse shocks, rather than a Kuznets-type process, led to a massive decline in inequality. The very high wealth concentration prior to 1914 benefited retired individuals living off capital income (rentiers) rather than entrepreneurs. The very rich were in their seventies and eighties, whereas they had been in their fifties a half century earlier and would be so again after World War II. Our results shed new light on ongoing debates about wealth inequality and growth.},
  keywords = {Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation},
  url_replication_files = {https://bibbase.org/network/publication/piketty-postelvinay-rosenthal-wealthconcentrationinadevelopingeconomyparisandfrance18071994replicationfiles-2005}
}

Using large samples of estate tax returns, we construct new series on wealth concentration in Paris and France from 1807 to 1994. Inequality increased until 1914 because industrial and financial estates grew dramatically. Then, adverse shocks, rather than a Kuznets-type process, led to a massive decline in inequality. The very high wealth concentration prior to 1914 benefited retired individuals living off capital income (rentiers) rather than entrepreneurs. The very rich were in their seventies and eighties, whereas they had been in their fifties a half century earlier and would be so again after World War II. Our results shed new light on ongoing debates about wealth inequality and growth.

@article{Meh2005,
  title = {Entrepreneurship, Wealth Inequality, and Taxation},
  author = {Meh, C{\'e}saire A.},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Review of Economic Dynamics},
  volume = {8},
  number = {3},
  pages = {688--719},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  doi = {10.1016/J.RED.2005.03.001},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2005.03.001},
  abstract = {This paper investigates the importance of entrepreneurship when quantifying the aggregate and distributional effects of switching from a progressive to a proportional income tax system. I find that the distributional consequences of the tax reform in a model economy with entrepreneurs contrast markedly from those in a model economy with no entrepreneurs. The elimination of progressive taxation has a negligible effect on wealth inequality when entrepreneurship is considered but has a large effect when entrepreneurship is omitted. The framework used is an occupational choice model, in which the decision to become an entrepreneur is determined by the ability to manage a firm and by asset holdings. The calibrated economy can account for the high savings rate of entrepreneurs relative to non-entrepreneurs, and the high concentration of wealth observed in the data.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Impacts of Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper investigates the importance of entrepreneurship when quantifying the aggregate and distributional effects of switching from a progressive to a proportional income tax system. I find that the distributional consequences of the tax reform in a model economy with entrepreneurs contrast markedly from those in a model economy with no entrepreneurs. The elimination of progressive taxation has a negligible effect on wealth inequality when entrepreneurship is considered but has a large effect when entrepreneurship is omitted. The framework used is an occupational choice model, in which the decision to become an entrepreneur is determined by the ability to manage a firm and by asset holdings. The calibrated economy can account for the high savings rate of entrepreneurs relative to non-entrepreneurs, and the high concentration of wealth observed in the data.

@article{Wahl2003,
  title = {From Riches to Riches: Intergenerational Transfers and the Evidence from Estate Tax Returns},
  author = {Wahl, Jenny B.},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Social Science Quarterly},
  volume = {84},
  number = {2},
  pages = {278--296},
  doi = {10.1111/1540-6237.8402004},
  url = {http://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6237.8402004},
  abstract = {Objective. Intergenerational transfers of wealth and ability can influence the distribution of wealth. This research examines the empirical relationships among intergenerational variables and cross-sectional wealth distribution. Methods. Models pioneered by Gary Becker set out the conditions necessary for regression to the mean in wealth across generations. However, empirical testing of such models has been incomplete because large, reliable, intergenerational data sets---especially with data from three generations---are hard to find. This article unveils a remarkable new source of intergenerationally linked data: federal estate tax records filed in Wisconsin from 1916 to 1981 and linked across three generations of families. Results. Wealth tends to regress to the mean at the top end of the distribution, but slowly. Consequently, wealth inequality in the United States is likely to persist. What is more, recent federal tax changes, particularly the repeal of the estate tax and the reduction in capital gains tax rates, will exacerbate cross-sectional wealth disparities. Conclusions. In the long run, intergenerational forces may help overcome inequalities in wealth across U.S. families. Empirical results suggest, however, that regression to the mean will occur quite slowly, and the long run could be long indeed.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

Objective. Intergenerational transfers of wealth and ability can influence the distribution of wealth. This research examines the empirical relationships among intergenerational variables and cross-sectional wealth distribution. Methods. Models pioneered by Gary Becker set out the conditions necessary for regression to the mean in wealth across generations. However, empirical testing of such models has been incomplete because large, reliable, intergenerational data sets—especially with data from three generations—are hard to find. This article unveils a remarkable new source of intergenerationally linked data: federal estate tax records filed in Wisconsin from 1916 to 1981 and linked across three generations of families. Results. Wealth tends to regress to the mean at the top end of the distribution, but slowly. Consequently, wealth inequality in the United States is likely to persist. What is more, recent federal tax changes, particularly the repeal of the estate tax and the reduction in capital gains tax rates, will exacerbate cross-sectional wealth disparities. Conclusions. In the long run, intergenerational forces may help overcome inequalities in wealth across U.S. families. Empirical results suggest, however, that regression to the mean will occur quite slowly, and the long run could be long indeed.

@incollection{BovenbergGoulder2002,
  title = {Environmental Taxation and Regulation},
  booktitle = {Handbook of Public Economics},
  author = {Bovenberg, A. Lans and Goulder, Lawrence H.},
  editor = {Auerbach, Alan J. and Feldstein, Martin},
  year = {2002},
  volume = {3},
  pages = {1471--1545},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam, The Netherlands},
  doi = {10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80027-1},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80027-1},
  abstract = {This chapter examines government policy alternatives for protecting the environment. We compare environmentally motivated taxes and various non-tax environmental policy instruments in terms of their efficiency and distributional impacts. Much of the analysis is performed in a second-best setting where the government relies on distortionary taxes to finance some of its budget. The chapter indicates that in this setting, general-equilibrium considerations have first-order importance in the evaluation of environmental policies. Indeed, some of the most important impacts of environmental policies take place outside of the market that is targeted for regulation. Section 2 examines the optimal level of environmental taxes, both in the absence of other taxes and in the second-best setting. Section 3 analyzes the impacts of environmental tax reforms, concentrating on revenue-neutral policies in which revenues from environmental taxes are used to finance cuts in ordinary, distortionary taxes. Here we explore in particular the circumstances under which the ``recycling'' of revenues from environmental taxes through cuts in distortionary taxes can eliminate the non-environmental costs of such reforms -- an issue that has sparked considerable interest in recent years. Section 4 compares environmental taxes with other policy instruments -- including emissions quotas, performance standards, and subsidies to abatement -- in economies with pre-existing distortionary taxes. We first compare these instruments assuming that policymakers face no uncertainties as to firms' abatement costs or the benefits of environmental improvement, and then expand the analysis to explore how uncertainty on the part of regulators and the associated monitoring and enforcement costs affect the choice among alternative policy instruments. Section 5 concentrates on the trade-offs between efficiency and distribution in a second-best setting. Section 6 offers conclusions.},
  chapter = {Ch. 23},
  isbn = {978-0-444-82314-4},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This chapter examines government policy alternatives for protecting the environment. We compare environmentally motivated taxes and various non-tax environmental policy instruments in terms of their efficiency and distributional impacts. Much of the analysis is performed in a second-best setting where the government relies on distortionary taxes to finance some of its budget. The chapter indicates that in this setting, general-equilibrium considerations have first-order importance in the evaluation of environmental policies. Indeed, some of the most important impacts of environmental policies take place outside of the market that is targeted for regulation. Section 2 examines the optimal level of environmental taxes, both in the absence of other taxes and in the second-best setting. Section 3 analyzes the impacts of environmental tax reforms, concentrating on revenue-neutral policies in which revenues from environmental taxes are used to finance cuts in ordinary, distortionary taxes. Here we explore in particular the circumstances under which the ``recycling'' of revenues from environmental taxes through cuts in distortionary taxes can eliminate the non-environmental costs of such reforms – an issue that has sparked considerable interest in recent years. Section 4 compares environmental taxes with other policy instruments – including emissions quotas, performance standards, and subsidies to abatement – in economies with pre-existing distortionary taxes. We first compare these instruments assuming that policymakers face no uncertainties as to firms' abatement costs or the benefits of environmental improvement, and then expand the analysis to explore how uncertainty on the part of regulators and the associated monitoring and enforcement costs affect the choice among alternative policy instruments. Section 5 concentrates on the trade-offs between efficiency and distribution in a second-best setting. Section 6 offers conclusions.

@incollection{SlemrodYitzhaki2002,
  title = {Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration},
  booktitle = {Handbook of Public Economics},
  author = {Slemrod, Joel and Yitzhaki, Shlomo},
  editor = {Auerbach, Alan J. and Feldstein, Martin},
  year = {2002},
  volume = {3},
  pages = {1423--1470},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  address = {Amsterdam, The Netherlands},
  doi = {10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80026-X},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80026-X},
  abstract = {Tax avoidance and evasion are pervasive in all countries, and tax structures are undoubtedly skewed by this reality. Standard models of taxation and their conclusions must reflect these realities. This paper first presents theoretical models that integrate avoidance and evasion into the overall decision problem faced by individuals. Early models of this area focused on tax evasion, modeled as a gamble against the enforcement capability of the state. More recently, the literature has examined more general models of the technology of avoidance, with the additional risk bearing caused by tax evasion either being a special case of this technology or one aspect of the cost of changing behavior to reduce tax liability. If the cost of evasion and avoidance depends on other aspects of behavior, the choice of consumption basket and avoidance become intertwined. The paper then relates the behavior predicted by the model to what is known empirically about the extent of evasion and avoidance, and how it responds to tax enforcement policy. The paper then turns to normative analysis, and discusses how avoidance and evasion affect the analysis of vertical and horizontal equity as well as efficiency costs; a taxonomy of efficiency costs is presented. Acknowledging the variety of behavioral responses to taxation changes the answers to traditional subjects of inquiry, such as incidence, optimal progressivity, and the optimal mix between income and consumption taxes. It also raises a whole new set of policy questions, such as the appropriate level of resources to devote to administration and enforcement, and how those resources should be deployed. Because there are a variety of policy instruments that can affect the magnitude and nature of avoidance and evasion response, the elasticity of behavioral response is itself a policy instrument, to be chosen optimally. The paper reviews what is known about these issues, and introduces a general theory of optimal tax systems, in which tax rates and bases are chosen simultaneously with the administrative and enforcement regimes. We argue that the concept of the marginal efficiency cost of funds is a useful way to summarize the normative issues that arise, and expand the concept to include administrative costs, avoidance, and evasion.},
  chapter = {Ch. 22},
  isbn = {978-0-444-82314-4},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

Tax avoidance and evasion are pervasive in all countries, and tax structures are undoubtedly skewed by this reality. Standard models of taxation and their conclusions must reflect these realities. This paper first presents theoretical models that integrate avoidance and evasion into the overall decision problem faced by individuals. Early models of this area focused on tax evasion, modeled as a gamble against the enforcement capability of the state. More recently, the literature has examined more general models of the technology of avoidance, with the additional risk bearing caused by tax evasion either being a special case of this technology or one aspect of the cost of changing behavior to reduce tax liability. If the cost of evasion and avoidance depends on other aspects of behavior, the choice of consumption basket and avoidance become intertwined. The paper then relates the behavior predicted by the model to what is known empirically about the extent of evasion and avoidance, and how it responds to tax enforcement policy. The paper then turns to normative analysis, and discusses how avoidance and evasion affect the analysis of vertical and horizontal equity as well as efficiency costs; a taxonomy of efficiency costs is presented. Acknowledging the variety of behavioral responses to taxation changes the answers to traditional subjects of inquiry, such as incidence, optimal progressivity, and the optimal mix between income and consumption taxes. It also raises a whole new set of policy questions, such as the appropriate level of resources to devote to administration and enforcement, and how those resources should be deployed. Because there are a variety of policy instruments that can affect the magnitude and nature of avoidance and evasion response, the elasticity of behavioral response is itself a policy instrument, to be chosen optimally. The paper reviews what is known about these issues, and introduces a general theory of optimal tax systems, in which tax rates and bases are chosen simultaneously with the administrative and enforcement regimes. We argue that the concept of the marginal efficiency cost of funds is a useful way to summarize the normative issues that arise, and expand the concept to include administrative costs, avoidance, and evasion.

@book{Slemrod2000,
  title = {Does {{Atlas}} Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich},
  editor = {Slemrod, Joel},
  year = {2000},
  publisher = {Harvard University Press},
  address = {Cambridge, MA},
  url = {https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674008151},
  abstract = {Since the introduction of the income tax in 1913, controversy has raged about how heavily to tax the rich. Opponents of high tax rates claim that heavy assessments have negative incentives on the productivity of some of our most talented citizens; supporters stress the importance of the rich shouldering their ``fair share,'' and decry the loopholes that permit many to escape their obligations. Notably absent from this debate is hard evidence about the actual impact of taxes on the behavior of the affluent. This book presents evidence by leading economists of the effects of taxes on the formation of businesses, the supply of labor, the form of executive compensation, the accumulation of wealth, the allocation of portfolios, and the realization of capital gains. Among its findings are that the labor supply of the rich remained unchanged in the face of large tax cuts in 1986, and that in late 1992 executives exercised billions of dollars' worth of stock options in order to beat the tax increases expected in 1993. The book also presents a history of efforts to tax the rich, a demographic snapshot of the financially affluent, and a road map to widely used tax-avoidance strategies. Does Atlas Shrug? will be of great interest to policymakers and interested citizens who want to know how much tax revenue could really be gained by increasing tax rates on the rich, or whether low capital gains tax rates really spur economic growth.},
  isbn = {0-674-00154-0},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

Since the introduction of the income tax in 1913, controversy has raged about how heavily to tax the rich. Opponents of high tax rates claim that heavy assessments have negative incentives on the productivity of some of our most talented citizens; supporters stress the importance of the rich shouldering their ``fair share,'' and decry the loopholes that permit many to escape their obligations. Notably absent from this debate is hard evidence about the actual impact of taxes on the behavior of the affluent. This book presents evidence by leading economists of the effects of taxes on the formation of businesses, the supply of labor, the form of executive compensation, the accumulation of wealth, the allocation of portfolios, and the realization of capital gains. Among its findings are that the labor supply of the rich remained unchanged in the face of large tax cuts in 1986, and that in late 1992 executives exercised billions of dollars' worth of stock options in order to beat the tax increases expected in 1993. The book also presents a history of efforts to tax the rich, a demographic snapshot of the financially affluent, and a road map to widely used tax-avoidance strategies. Does Atlas Shrug? will be of great interest to policymakers and interested citizens who want to know how much tax revenue could really be gained by increasing tax rates on the rich, or whether low capital gains tax rates really spur economic growth.

@article{Smith1997,
  title = {Wealth Inequality among Older Americans},
  author = {Smith, James P.},
  year = {1997},
  journal = {The Journals of Gerontology Series B},
  volume = {52B},
  pages = {74--81},
  doi = {10.1093/geronb/52B.Special_Issue.74},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/52B.Special_Issue.74},
  abstract = {Using the AHEAD study, this article examines the wealth distribution among American households with a member at least 70 years old. Household wealth is quite unevenly distributed among older American households. Those households in the top 10th percentile of the wealth distribution have 2,500 times as much wealth as those at the lowest 10th percent. This sharp wealth disparity relative to income dispersion is the dominant reason why older minority households have accumulated so little wealth compared to White households. Wealth varies by a factor of seven to one when both spouses are in poor health compared to when they say that they are in excellent health. Finally, AHEAD data on bequest intentions suggest a bifurcated bequest motive. Most older households plan to bequeath a modest financial inheritance, but about one-quarter expect to leave inheritances worth \$100,000 or more.},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Wealth Taxation}
}

Using the AHEAD study, this article examines the wealth distribution among American households with a member at least 70 years old. Household wealth is quite unevenly distributed among older American households. Those households in the top 10th percentile of the wealth distribution have 2,500 times as much wealth as those at the lowest 10th percent. This sharp wealth disparity relative to income dispersion is the dominant reason why older minority households have accumulated so little wealth compared to White households. Wealth varies by a factor of seven to one when both spouses are in poor health compared to when they say that they are in excellent health. Finally, AHEAD data on bequest intentions suggest a bifurcated bequest motive. Most older households plan to bequeath a modest financial inheritance, but about one-quarter expect to leave inheritances worth $100,000 or more.

@article{WallersteinPrzeworski1995,
  title = {Capital Taxation with Open Borders},
  author = {Wallerstein, Michael and Przeworski, Adam},
  year = {1995},
  journal = {Review of International Political Economy},
  volume = {2},
  number = {3},
  pages = {425--445},
  doi = {10.1080/09692299508434328},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09692299508434328},
  abstract = {Since 1975, both corporate income tax rates and top marginal income tax rates have been lowered in most OECD countries. A common explanation of this phenomenon is that increased international capital mobility reduced the ability of governments to tax income from capital. In this paper, we examine the constraints on the taxation of income from capital with free capital mobility. We demonstrate that capital mobility increases the constraints on the taxation of income from capital only when investors expect future taxes to rise. As long as taxes are stable, governments using the right tax instruments can collect substantial taxes on uninvested profits without affecting private investment whether capital is mobile or not. We conclude that increased capital mobility is not a compelling explanation of the reduction in tax rates that has occurred in the past fifteen years.},
  isbn = {9780511619793},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

Since 1975, both corporate income tax rates and top marginal income tax rates have been lowered in most OECD countries. A common explanation of this phenomenon is that increased international capital mobility reduced the ability of governments to tax income from capital. In this paper, we examine the constraints on the taxation of income from capital with free capital mobility. We demonstrate that capital mobility increases the constraints on the taxation of income from capital only when investors expect future taxes to rise. As long as taxes are stable, governments using the right tax instruments can collect substantial taxes on uninvested profits without affecting private investment whether capital is mobile or not. We conclude that increased capital mobility is not a compelling explanation of the reduction in tax rates that has occurred in the past fifteen years.

@unpublished{Auerbach1988,
  title = {Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation},
  author = {Auerbach, Alan J.},
  year = {1988},
  address = {Cambridge, MA},
  doi = {10.3386/w2792},
  url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w2792.pdf http://doi.org/10.3386/w2792},
  abstract = {This paper presents a new approach to the taxation of capital gains that eliminates the deferral advantage present under current realization-based systems, along with the lock-in effect and tax arbitrage possibilities associated with thia deferral advantage. The new approach also taxes capital gains only upon realization but, by effectively charging interest on past gains when realization finally occurs, eliminates the incentive to defer such realization. Unlike a similar scheme suggested previously by Vickrey, the present one does not require knowledge of the potentially unobservable pattern ofgainsovertime. It thus is applicable to a very broad range of capital assets.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation},
  note = {Unpublished manuscript}
}

This paper presents a new approach to the taxation of capital gains that eliminates the deferral advantage present under current realization-based systems, along with the lock-in effect and tax arbitrage possibilities associated with thia deferral advantage. The new approach also taxes capital gains only upon realization but, by effectively charging interest on past gains when realization finally occurs, eliminates the incentive to defer such realization. Unlike a similar scheme suggested previously by Vickrey, the present one does not require knowledge of the potentially unobservable pattern ofgainsovertime. It thus is applicable to a very broad range of capital assets.

@article{Chamley1986,
  title = {Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives},
  author = {Chamley, Christophe},
  year = {1986},
  month = may,
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {54},
  number = {3},
  eprint = {1911310},
  eprinttype = {jstor},
  pages = {607--622},
  doi = {10.2307/1911310},
  url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911310},
  abstract = {This paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best. Agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the Koopmans form. The population is heterogeneous. The important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run. I find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run. For a special case of additively separable utility functions, I then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state.},
  keywords = {Wealth Taxation}
}

This paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best. Agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the Koopmans form. The population is heterogeneous. The important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run. I find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run. For a special case of additively separable utility functions, I then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state.

@article{Kennedy1980,
  title = {Reviewed Work: Inheritance and Wealth Inequality in Britain by {{C}}. {{D}}. Harbury and {{D}}. {{M}}. {{W}}. {{N}}. Hitchens},
  author = {Kennedy, William P.},
  year = {1980},
  journal = {The Economic History Review},
  volume = {33},
  number = {4},
  pages = {636--638},
  doi = {10.2307/2594821},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2594821},
  keywords = {Intergenerational Wealth,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

@book{Pondetal1980,
  title = {Taxing Wealth Inequalities},
  author = {Pond, C. and Burghes, L. and Smith, B.},
  year = {1980},
  month = jan,
  series = {Fabian {{Tract}}},
  number = {466},
  publisher = {Fabian Society},
  url = {https://digital.library.lse.ac.uk/objects/lse:dir903zoz},
  urldate = {2022-02-02},
  isbn = {978-0-7163-0466-1},
  keywords = {Cross-National Comparisons,Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Estate Inheritance and Gift Taxes,Intergenerational Wealth,Wealth Taxation}
}

@article{Atkinson1978,
  title = {The Concentration of Wealth in Britain},
  author = {Atkinson, A. B.},
  year = {1978},
  journal = {Challenge},
  volume = {21},
  number = {3},
  pages = {38--42},
  doi = {10.1080/05775132.1978.11470433},
  url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/40719758 https://doi.org/10.1080/05775132.1978.11470433},
  abstract = {Britain's Inland Revenue figures on the concentration of wealth have proved to be substantially correct. A "wealth tax" may be necessary to reduce inequality further.},
  keywords = {Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

Britain's Inland Revenue figures on the concentration of wealth have proved to be substantially correct. A "wealth tax" may be necessary to reduce inequality further.

@book{Atkinson1972,
  title = {Unequal Shares: Wealth in {{Britain}}},
  author = {Atkinson, A. B.},
  year = {1972},
  publisher = {Allen Lane},
  address = {London},
  url = {https://archive.org/details/unequalshareswea0000atki},
  isbn = {0-7139-0281-7},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Estate Inheritance and Gift Taxes,Intergenerational Wealth,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Trends in Aggregate Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

@article{Atkinson1971,
  title = {Capital Taxes, the Redistribution of Wealth and Individual Savings},
  author = {Atkinson, A. B.},
  year = {1971},
  journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
  volume = {38},
  number = {2},
  pages = {209--227},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  doi = {10.2307/2296780},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2296780},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Estate Inheritance and Gift Taxes,Wealth Taxation}
}

@article{Atkinson1971a,
  title = {The Distribution of Wealth and the Individual Life-Cycle},
  author = {Atkinson, A. B.},
  year = {1971},
  journal = {Oxford Economic Papers},
  volume = {23},
  number = {2},
  eprint = {2662236},
  eprinttype = {jstor},
  pages = {239--254},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/2662236},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Intergenerational Wealth,Wealth Taxation}
}